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ABSTRACT
Scholars suggest missiles have become the weapon of choice in modem warfare.
Missiles are effective against a variety of targets, can travel long distances, and can
decrease the need for troops to be engaged in conflict. Nations unable to mobilize large
amounts of troops may depend on missiles to equalize military capabilities. Missile
stockpiling also serves as a conflict deterrent. What factors influence missile sales
between nations and what are the implications of those sales on regional security? This
research broadly analyzes the effects of political, socioeconomic, conflict, temporal, and
regional factors on global missile sales between 1980 and 2009, while specifically
focusing on the implications of Sino-Iranian missile sales on regional security.
Among factors contributing to instance and quantity of missile sales, scholars
argue economic factors are most salient. However, this research questions that
supposition and analyzes a host of hypotheses to determine the importance of a variety of
factors influencing missile transfers. Tests of several models confirm a number of factors
influence missile transfers, the most influential being whether or not the receiving country
is in the Middle East. Economic factors, as expected, influence missile purchasing
behavior. Countries with an overall high total GDP but low GDP per capita purchased
more missiles than countries with low GDPs and high GDPs per capita. China exports
fewer missiles to nations in the midst of conflict, or to nations bordering other nations in
conflict, which challenges conventional wisdom.
The People’s Republic of China, as a major world proliferator, contributes to the
security dilemma in the Middle East by supplying Iran with missiles and related
technology. Through improving relations with Iran, China solidifies a trading partner to
satiate its growing demand for oil while also developing a new market in which to sell

in

Chinese products. Iran gains an economic powerhouse and member of the UN Security
Council as an ally from the relationship.
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Introduction
Since China’s Reform and Opening Up in 1978, the economy of the People s
Republic of China has grown rapidly. China became the largest world exporter in 2010
and continues to expand its global presence. Scholars argue China’s expanding Middle
East strategy focuses on economic gains rather than political power exertion. China s past
and possible future sales of military goods threaten both regional and global security. This
study focuses on China’s missile sales and poses two main questions:

1) From a quantitative standpoint, what are the most important factors in
determining missile sales by China to other nations, and;

2) What are the implications on missile proliferation from those sales on regional
security?
Data used in this thesis come from document review and a number of databases.
Data collection from a variety of sources enhances data reliability and validity. Following
collection, the data and documents will be analyzed using analytical techniques used by
the Intelligence Community and statistical analysis used in the field of political science.
Finally, conclusions will be drawn based on the empirical evidence. The structure of this
research follows that of the Intelligence Community’s National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) model supplemented with a quantitative section. The qualitative portion
specifically focuses on missile sales from China to Iran and the subsequent effects on
regional security.

Study Background
Barry Rubin, director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center, and
Dr. Subhash Kapila, author and strategic affairs analyst, both have written on the
importance of the Sino-Iranian relationship. Rubin argues that China seeks to increase
2

economic relationship with Iran, while Kapila suggests the relationship hinges on political
and military cooperation.
According to Rubin, in 1990 the Middle East became China’s fourth largest
trading partner. Arms sales to the Middle East have proved particularly lucrative for
China. Despite the potential economic gains from selling missiles to Iran, China runs
major political risks from missile proliferation. Rubin suggests four major problems with
the Sino-lranian relationship. First, Iran threatens regional security. By selling missiles to
Iran, China increases Iran's ability to coerce and threaten Middle Eastern states, thereby
contributing to conflict in the Middle East. Second, since the United States considers Iran
a nation that harbors terrorism, the US strongly discourages China from selling arms to
Iran. Third, Iran seeks to develop and build arms, and encourages China to provide Iran
with arms, thereby pressuring China to violate international nonproliferation treaties and
commitments. Finally, China serves as Iran’s primary supplier of unconventional arms.
According to Kapila, Iran likely stands as China’s only “worthwhile” political and
military ally in the Middle East.^ Considering the historically amicable relationship
between the two nations, as well as Iran’s aggressive nature, the relationship between the
nations in dealing with missiles will likely be a growing and continuing threat to regional
stability. Since 2006, the UN Security Council has passed three resolutions requiring Iran
to suspend all nuclear enrichment-related activities. Two of those resolutions imposed
economic sanctions against Iran. The sanctions include constraints on Iran’s arms exports,
restrictions on nuclear trade with Iran, and bans on financial dealings with entities
connected to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.^ However, Saudi Arabia has surpassed

‘ Rubin, Barry. “China’s Middle East Strategy.” Middle East Review ofInternational Affairs. 3.1. Mar
1999. <http;//meria.idc.ac.il/JOURNAL/l999/issuel/rubin.pdt^
^ Kapila. Subhash, Ph.D. “Iran in the Strategic Matrix of Russia. China, and India; An Analysis." South
Asia Analysis Group. 2005. <http://w\Nvv.southasiaanalysis.org/papersl3/paper 1284.html>
’ Gordon. Philip I I. “Iran Sanctions and Regional Security.” House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 23
October 2007. <http://\vvvu .brookings.edu/testimony72007/1023iran.aspx>
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Iran as China’s largest trading partner in the Middle East, according to a 2012 China
Daily report.^

Purpose and Scope of the Study
As technology has developed, nations have implemented new technologies to
more effectively conduct war. Missiles have increasingly become one of the most desired
weapons to both conduct and deter war. Both developed and developing nations seek to
acquire missiles for both offensive and defensive purposes. The importance

of missile

proliferation in relation to international security leads to a vast amount of qualitative
research on the subject, though a paucity of literature on statistical analysis of weapons
proliferation exists. Most related research focuses on qualitative analysis to formulate
policy and determine security implications of missile sales. Scholars have suggested a
number of factors influencing global missile transfers, but few have tested these empirical
relationships between these factors and missile proliferation. Formulating a product that
combines both quantitative and qualitative analysis, which wiill arguably make the
conclusions more robust, serves as a main focus of this paper. Thus, this research seeks to
bridge the gap between these two approaches of studying weapons proliferation.

Overview of Methodology
This thesis consists of two portions: the first part contains

quantitative analysis

of factors that influence missiles sales and analysis of prior missile sales and their usage
in order to extrapolate the implications of possible future missile transfers from China to

^ Jing, Cai. “Chinese builders set vision on booming Saudi Arabia economy.” 9 August 2012.
<hUp://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2()12-09/08/content_ 15744475.hlm>
4

Iran. The second contains an NIE examining the factors that drive missile proliferation
and effects of China’s missile sales to Iran on regional security.
Quantitative Section
The statistical portion of the research investigates the correlations between
China’s exportation of missiles and social, economic, political, and conflict factors. The
data will cover a period of thirty years (1980 to 2009) to take into account the effect
historical events may have had on the missile transfers from China, Israel, and the
USSR/Russia to other nations. Several databases were combined into a more concise
database used in this analytical paper.
In setting up a theoretical framework for explaining missile proliferation, social,
economic, political, and conflict factors alone indubitably cannot fully explain missile
sales. There are factors not included in this analysis that affect the export and import of
missiles. This product attempts to analyze a variety of independent variables that
influence China’s missile transfers including GDP, GDP per capita, total population,
major episodes of political violence, regional conflict, and historical events. The instance
of missile sales (defined as the country-year in which missiles were transferred) and the
volume of missiles imported/exported will serve as the dependent variables. Data
categorized by year forms a time series ranging from 1980 to 2009. Past pertinent events
will be included as independent variables in the creation of a time series analysis to
account for major shifts in global political structure and international conflict, most
notably the Iran-Iraq War and the Cold War. These factors will be discussed more indepth in the qualitative portion.

5

Qualitative Section
The qualitative portion of this research focuses on tailoring the statistical analysis
into an actionable form of intelligence for policymakers. The section will be structured in
the form of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) with a scope note, key judgments, and
an in-depth discussion of Iran’s missile purchases from China.

Stages of Research
First, a rigorous literature review was conducted on past research and historical
information regarding missile proliferation. Scholars assert that the underlying factors
affecting China’s missile sales are primarily financial. This product will evaluate the role
of economic factors in comparison to political, social, and conflict factors in order to
either validate or invalidate prior literature and research on the subject.
The first section of this research consists of a number of subsections. The first
subsection contains a statistical analysis of the internal political, social, and economic
factors of recipient and seller nations and their correlations with missile transfers. The
second subsection focuses on regional and historical factors, including major episodes of
political violence, number of bordering states involved in conflict, and the role of
historical events (including the end of the Cold War and the Iran-lraq War) in
determining missile transfers.
The second section analyzes the effects on Middle Eastern security of missile
sales from China to Iran. The scope note addresses the key questions of the assessment.
The key judgments section makes predictions of how Iran’s developing missile program
affects regional security and the likelihood of those predictions coming to fruition, as well
as justifications of each judgment. Finally, the discussion focuses on historical trends and
economic data and possible future implications of Chinese missile sales to Iran, and
6

predicts major suppliers of missile to Iran using an analysis of competing hypotheses
(ACH). Conclusions are then drawn based on the prior analysis of data as to the
implications for regional stability.
Missile Proliferation and the Role of Missiles in Modern Warfare
This section gives a brief history of the role of missiles in modem warfare and
discusses drivers of missile proliferation. Since World War II, missiles have been an
integral weapon of national militaries and non-state actors.^ Blanton suggests that, after
the Vietnam War, sending missiles to various nations throughout the world was a better
policy than putting US troops in danger worldwide.^ Soon after, arms spread into Eastern
Europe and Israel, and finally to the Middle East."^ During the 1980s, the US began using
missiles as a deterrent against the Soviet Union.
During the Cold War, the USSR and the US amassed stockpiles of nuclear
weapons, ultimately to the level that a nuclear war would have rendered the earth
8

uninhabitable, leading to formation of the idea of “mutually assured destruction,

After

the dissolution of the Iron Curtain, the arms control community shifted its focus from
nuclear disarmament to limiting missile and small arms transfers.^ A number of nations
possess the materials and technology required to produce missiles and many nations
possess both offensive and defensive missile capabilities. Since the fall of the Soviet

^ Project of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. “Missile Proliferation and Missile Defenses.
Nuclearfiles.org <http://www.nuclearriles.org/menu/key-issues/missile-defense/basics/missileproliferation-defenses.htm>
^ Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. “Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights. Democracy, and U.S. Arms
Exports. ” International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 49, No.4(Dec., 2005), pp. 647-667.
<http://www.Jstor.org/stable/3693504>
’Said, Mohammed Kadry. “Missile proliferation in the Middle East: a regional perspective. ” Disarmament
Forum. 2001. 54. < http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art75.pdf>
® Parrinton. Alan J., Colonel. USAF.“Mutually Assured Destruction KeVxsxiQd." Airpower Journal. Winter
1997. <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apJ97/win97/parrin.html>
’Issa, Alaa. “The Drivers Behind Missile Proliferation." Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and
Prospects. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Monterey Institute of International Studies. 2009. 3-5.
<http://wwvi’.mcis.soton.ac.uk/publications/missile_proliferation.pdf>
7

Union, developing nations, most notably China, have

become

involved

in

the

10

international arms trade.

Dinshaw Mistry, associate professor of political science at the Univcrsit> of
Cincinnati, discusses five reasons states seek nuclear and missile programs:
1. Technology Pull, or Availability of Technology
2. Bureaucratic Political Pressure
3. Prestige Considerations
4. Security Threats
5. Economic Motivations
, and factors
Mistry warns that not all factors drive each nation’s desire for these programs
11

vary from state to state.
According to Alaa Issa, counselor with the Permanent

Mission of Egypt to the

United Nations, four factors drive missile proliferation; (1)

Technical Drivers; (2)
are

Coercion/Deterrence;(3) Military/Strategic factors; and (4) Political factors. Missiles
desirable weapons for a number of reasons. Compared to the speed of aircraft, missiles
prove particularly advantageous. The use of missiles assures target destruction. Despite
the advent of advanced PATRIOT missiles and missile defense systems, missile defense
12

remains sophisticated, expensive, and not completely effective,

Issa suggests the proven

effectiveness of cruise missiles will make them the choice of weapons in the future.
Missiles provide military and strategic roles that other weapons

cannot. They travel at

high speeds over long distances fairly accurately and are effective against a variety of
46!

targets, notably structures and cities. According to Issa,

in some cases the political

Bilzinger, Richard A."Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World.” International Secw ify.
17,2; 1992. <hUp://wvm.jstor.org/stablc/i323299 >
" Mistry, Dinshaw. Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology. Security Regimes, and
International Cooperation in Arms Control. University of Washington Press, 2003. 6-7.
Issa, Alaa. “The Drivers Behind Missile Proliferation.” Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and
Prospects Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Monterey Institute of International Studies. 2009. 3-5.
<htlp;//www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/publications/missile_proliferation.pdP>
8

13

considerations alone can be the primary driver for missile acquisition,

Though Issa’s

paper lists a number of factors driving missile proliferation, the lack of empirical
evidence backing his suggestions undermines his estimation of to what extent these
factors play in missile proliferation.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMDs)and transfer of WMDS
between states stands as "‘one of the principal security challenges facing the United States
,,I4

in the twenty-first century.

Peppi DeBiaso of the Office of Missile Defense Policy in

the Department of Defense (DoD) assesses that the accelerating growth of proliferation
gives an increasing number of states offensive missile and WMD capabilities, thereby
reshaping the nature of conflict. As a result of American dominance in traditional forms
of warfare, “potential adversaries” seek “to shift the military competition away from
15

traditional forms of warfare and adopt weapons and methods of asymmetrical conflict.
DeBiaso cites ten instances of ballistic missile warfare since 1980 in his analysis, eight of
which took place in the Middle East, solidifying his claim that missiles are used for
“increasing the strategic capabilities of states, including small and weak powers, by
giving them the means to threaten or strike a wide range of vital targets, both locally and
vl6

at great distances.

DeBiaso’s work gives a qualitative analysis of how proliferation of

ballistic missiles has redefined modern warfare. He draws conclusions strictly based on
qualitative evidence and historical precedent. The research suggests new patterns in
proliferation, as Russia and China provide missile acquisition assistance to third parties,
but does not provide a model to predict future proliferation.

DeBiaso, Peppi. “Proliferation. Missile Defense and the Conduct of Modern War. Comparative
Strategy, 25: \57-\n. 2006.
■' Ibid. 158
16
Ibid. 159
9

Future Ballistic Missile Threat: National Intelligence Estimate
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). the U.S. Intelligence Comniunit\ s (1C)
most “authoritative and coordinated written assessmcnt[s] of a specillc national-security
17

issue,” must be speculative to some extent,

Therefore, NlE.s arc subject to scrutiny^

as

evidenced by the failed 2002 Iraq NIE. The "Foreign Missile Developments and the
Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,” a partly declassified NIH reporting "intemgence
of December 2001. focuses on
on ballistic missile developments and threats” as
..), discusses
projecting “possible and likely ballistic missile threats to the United States
|
.
.,18

the proliferation environment; and provides a summary of [...J cruise missiles.
The authors of the estimate admit their assessments arc

"inexact and subjective

” and furthermore admit they
because they are often based on fragmentary information
ic, and social changes
have not “attempted to address all of the potential political, econom
that could occur.

19

. The most
Nonetheless, the authors give a number of key Judgments
that before 2015, the U. S.

relevant to this paper include: (1) Most IC agencies project
will face ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran; (2) Proliferation

of technologies by

countries such as China have enabled more states to accelerate missile develop
(3) Iran is pursuing missile capabilities. Since 2001, the United States has indeed been
increasingly threatened by North Korea and Iran’s growing ballistic missile capabilities,
all over the
China, both directly and indirectly, has supplied missiles to nations in regions
world. China has been instrumental in helping Iran to develop ballistic missiles by
providing materials, technology, and guidance. Iran has continued to develop its weapon
programs since 2001. Policymakers and intelligence analysts are worried Tran is not only
developing missile capabilities, but also nuclear weapon capabilities.
Bruno, Greg and Sharon Ollcrman. “National Intelligence Estimates. Council on Foreign Relations.
<hUp://www.cfr.org/iraq/national-inlelligence-estimates/p7758>
Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. National Intelligence
Council. December 2001. < https://www.fas.org/irp/nic/bmthreat-2015.htm>
'' Ibid. 1
10

The discussion section of the National Intelligence Council’s NIE details the
stockpiles of missiles possessed by Iran and their specifications and capabilities. The NIE
does not, however, take into account the effects domestic and international factors might
play into foreign missile development and proliferation. However, the NIE does assess
with high confidence that the development of missile programs will affect regional
stability.

Non-Proliferation Policy
Non-proliferation focuses on limiting the spread of CBRNe weapons (Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and explosive), particularly nuclear weapons and
associated technologies.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) contractually
obligates the recognized five nuclear weapon states (China, the US, the Russian
Federation, the UK,and France) not to “transfer nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive
«20

devices, or their technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state,

Non-nuclear-weapon

states agree not to purchase or produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives. In order to
ensure this does not happen, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspects
the facilities of these nations. The NPT, currently the most widely signed nonproliferation
agreement, has not been signed by a handful of nations. Only Jordan, India, and Pakistan
have never signed the NPT, though North Korea withdrew its signature in 2003. Though
no illegal transfers of banned materials or technology from signatory states have been
confirmed, some states have been able to obtain technology and equipment from private
parties within signatory states.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a voluntary agreement
between 34 nations sharing the goals of“non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems
20

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.’* The Federation ofAmerican Scientists.
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/>
11

capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction” was established in 1987 b\’ the G-7.
21

Nations that have signed the MTCR share goals of preventing the unauihori/.cd transfer
of unmanned weapons delivery systems, including rockets and
materials, and technology. The regime’s objectives specifically
proliferation of “missiles, complete rocket systems, unmanned air

other equipment,
refer to restricting

vehicles, and related

technology [...] capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers.
China has considered becoming a partner of the agreement in both 2000 and 2004. but so
without
far has declined to join and instead simply agreed to adhere to the stipulations
signing the agreement.

23,24

Reports indicate China has not ceased from
25

technology to nations such as Pakistan.

selling

have

continued

to

raise

miss'

In fact, in a Congressional Research Service

paper, Shirley Kan, specialist in Asian Security Affairs, suggests
activities

missiles and

about

questions
,26

nonproliferation and the need for U.S. sanctions.

China’s proliferation

China’s

commitment

to

One of the most egregious examples
Reuter’s report

of illegal sales of banned materials comes from China. According to a
published on March 1, 2013, Li Fangwei, the owner

of the LIMMT steel company, has
1999, when a

made approximately $10 million from selling banned materials to Iran since
New York court indicted him for selling components that can be used to enrich uranium
and [develop] guidance devices suitable for missiles.

22

In 2011, Li agreed to provide

The Missile Technology Control Regime. <hup://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html>
Ibid.

23

Arms Control Association. “The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance.”
<htlp://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtcr>
■ Joseph, Anil K.“China ready to join MTCR to control missile proliferation”. Rediff: India Abroad. Jun
2004. < hup;//www.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/03mtcr.htm>

24

26

Kan, Shirley A.“China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues."
federation ofAmerican Scientists. 9 November 2011. <htlp;//www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RI.3 1 555.pdf>
12

gyroscopes, a key component in missiles and a controlled item under the MTCR, to
Iran.27
Signatory states hope nonproliferation treaties will reduce the volume and
instances of missile transfers and development of weapons programs in states
unauthorized to develop such programs. However, nonproliferation treaties do not
completely prevent the transfer of restricted materials and technology. Though China has
signed some nonproliferation agreement, it is clear private parties within China have
violated these agreements.

A Similar Study: Nuclear Weapon Proliferation
Jo and Gartzke's “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation” paper uses a
28

quantitative approach to explain nuclear weapons proliferation,

They assess the effects

of domestic and international factors that influence a nation’s decision to develop a
nuclear weapons program and to produce nuclear weapons between 1939 and 1992. The
authors clarify that the current nuclear weapon states obtained their “arsenals [...] through
the step of a nuclear weapons development program.”^^Jo and Gartzke argue that most
nuclear proliferation research focuses on analysis of cases. They agree that there are few
examples of statistical analysis being applied to the problem of nuclear weapon
30

proliferation,

The authors consider multivariate regression models as an important way

to understand nuclear proliferation. Jo and Gartzke develop a conceptual framework
31

based on the ideas of “willingness” and “opportunity” discussed by Most and Starr.
Basically, willingness refers to a state being eager to pursue a weapons program.
27

Maclean. William and Ben Blanchard. “Exclusive: Chinese trader accused of busting Iran missile
embargo.” Reuters. 1 March 2013. <http://w\vw.reuters.com/article/2013/03/01/us-china-iran-traderidUSBRE9200BI20130301>
28
Jo, Dong-Joon and Erik Gartzke. “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation. Journal of Conflict
Resolution. 2007; 51. 167: 167-194.
29
Ibid. 168
30
Ibid. 167
Most. Benjamin A. and Harvey Starr Inquiry. Logic, and International Politics. 1989.
13

Opportunity refers to the “possibilities [...] available to any entity [. ■■] representing the
total set of environmental constraints and possibilities.”^' These factors serve as a
framework to develop testable models explaining the interactions between their variables.
The research focuses on estimating the "effects of measures of opporiunii\' and
.33

willingness on nuclear weapons programs and

[. . .]

possession.'

'I'hc

dependent

variables in the study are NWEAPON and NPROGRAM. NWEAPON identifies whether
or not a state possesses weapons in a given year. NPROGRAM identifies whether the
state has an active nuclear weapons program in a given year. The dependent variables
used included opportunity variables and willingness variables. Opportunity variables are
broken into latent nuclear weapons production capability, economic capacity, and
diffusion, or the spreading of knowledge of how to construct nuclear weapons over tune.
Willingness variables are subdivided into 3 categories: (1)

International Security; (2)

Domestic Politics; and (3) Status. International security focuses on
measure, a nuclear threat dummy variable, the presence of a

conventional threat

nuclear defense pact, and

diplomatic isolation. Domestic politics are defined by measures
democracy scores on a political thermometer, and membership in

of domestic unrest,
the NPT. The status

portion is separated into global power status and regional power status.
Analysis of the data shows diffusion increases the “predicted probability of a state
developing a nuclear weapons program and also raises
proliferation,

,34

the risk of nuclear weapon

Economic capacity only increased the predicted probability of possession

of nuclear weapons. Latent nuclear weapons production capability showed a positi\ e and
significant relationship with the presence of nuclear weapons programs

. Conventional

threat was calculated using a summation of Composite Index of National Capabilities

Jo. Dong-Joon and Erik Gartzke. “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation.” Journal ofC onfici
Resolution. 2007:51, 167; 167-194.
” Ibid. 172
Ibid. 176
14

(CFNC)score, which was then divided by the state's CINC score and finally transformed
into a natural log. The conventional threat variable showed a positive correlation with the
dependent variables, indicating insecurity is a factor in encouraging proliferation.
Domestic unrest was not statistically significant. Democracy score played only a small
role in explaining the predicted nuclear proliferation. Major power status and regional
power status both showed a positive and statistically significant correlation in the
outcome.
This research allows for predictions about nuclear proliferation trends through the
use of statistical analysis and sets a promising precedent for using the concept, though not
necessarily the same model, to assess determinants of missile proliferation. It provides an
important example of research bridging the gap between political science research and the
Intelligence Community analysis.
Missile Proliferation and Usage: Sino-Iranian Relations
The Cold War significantly affected the relations between Iran and China. In the
mid-20‘‘' Century, China held an anti-Shah position. The PRC viewed the Shah as a
puppet of the United States’ interests in the Middle East. However, following the split in
ideology between China and the Soviet Union, China and Iran saw the Soviet Union as a
common enemy In the 1970s, Iran supported China’s entry into the UN, though their
relationship was still largely based on mutual animosity towards the Soviet Union as
opposed to a cultural and economic relationship. After Khomeini took power, China took
steps to increase its relations with Iran. Though many communists were executed in Iran
under Khomeini’s regime and China persecuted Chinese Muslims in its eastern provinces,
the two nations remained on mutually cordial terms. Sino-Iranian military cooperation
began with the Iran-Iraq War. Initially, Iran’s arsenal consisted of primarily US-provided
weaponry. After the USSR and Western Europe restricted arms sales to Iran, as supplies
15
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dwindled, China became a major arms provider for Iran,

However, as Beijing had taken

a “strong moral stance” on the war, the PRC "decided that Chinese entities should not sell
,.36

directly to either side.
Consequently, Syria and North Korea became the "major intermediaries for the
sale of Chinese military goods.

.37

In

1986 , China provided

\v ith

Iran

200

HY-2

Silkworm” anti-ship cruise missiles. Beijing claims North Korea sold these missiles to
of the iIY-2 missiles

Iran, but US intelligence sources indicate that China sold some
directly to Iran.

38

In the early months of 1988, Iraqis launched 160 SCUD missiles toward

Tehran, just a miniscule portion of the vast quantities of missiles fired between
countries during the Iran-Iraq War.

39

During the war, China sold at least 8,400 missiles to

Iran and 1.200 missiles to Iraq. Though China supplied arms

to both sides. China viewed

Iraq as loyal to the Soviet Union. After turbulent events in both nations in the late 1980s,
40

Iran relied on supplies from China to rebuild its military prowess,
al, Iran purchased an “estimated $400 million worth of weapons
1993 and 1996.'
anti-ship missile.

According to Davis et

from the PRC between

In 1999, the PRC agreed to help Iran modify a

Chinese FL-7 missile

41

Between 2002 and 2005, missiles sales from China to Iran dropped roughly 50/o,
42

from around $100 million to $50 million, largely due to sanctions.

Davis et al. argue

35

Davis, Marybelh, el al. '‘China-Iran; A Limited Partnership.” Centra I echnology, Inc.
Economic and Security Review Commission. October 2012. 35
<http://www.uscc.gov/rescarchpapcrs/2012/USCC_China-Iran-Nov—28. pdl'>
Ibid 35
37
Ibid 35
38

Ibid 36
1
w "
McNaughtcr, Thomas L. “Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons; The Legacy of the Iran-lraq war,
Iniernaiional Security. 15,2: 1990. <http://0www.jslor.org.umiss .lib.olcmiss.edu/slable/2538864>
Gentry, Brandon J. “The Dragon and the Magi: Burgeoning Sino-Iranian Relations in the 21 Centui y.
The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. 3,3. Nov 2005.
<hllp://se2.isn.eh/serviccengine/Files/RriSSpccNct/32217/ichaptersection_singlcdocument/65148D33C647-4825-81B4-6562E919rD30/en/l 2_Dragon Magi_Burgconing,pdf>
Davis, Marybelh, el al. “China-lran: A Limited Partnership.” Centra Technology, Inc. US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission. October 2012. 38
<hltp://www,uscc.gov/rescarchpapers/2012/USCC_China-Iran-Nov—28, pdf>
Ibid. 38

39
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sanctions have primarily affected Iran's energy sector, banking institutions, imports, and
business, though reports conflict as to whether or not sanctions have affected Iran’s
development of weapons programs. Some reports indicate that Iran “manages to bypass
43

UN sanctions” though information about Iran’s weapons trade proves difficult to gamer.

Theoretical Framework
What factors influence missile proliferation? This analytical research specifically
investigates the relationships between China’s missile outflow with social, economic,
political, and conflict factors, and compares those factors to missile transfers made by
Russia and Israel. Between 1980 and 2009. the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is
confirmed to have exported 17,857 missiles to nations around the world.'^'^ Although
scholars and government agencies cite China as one of the world’s greatest weapon
proliferators, little research has been done to determine the factors that drive missile
proliferation. The former USSR and today’s Russia have continued to be a provider of
missiles to other nations. In 2000. President Clinton met with Vladimir Putin to discuss
the threat of growing missile proliferation, particularly in regards to delivery mechanisms
45

for weapons of mass destruction.
Social, economic, political, and conflict independent variables were included in
the regression analysis. The following section describes in detail the measurements and
aspects of each of the independent and dependent variables, and how the variables are
expected to interact.

43

Ibid 45-47
SIPRI
Arms Transfer Database, <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php>
45
Smith, Mark.“The MTCR and the Future of Ballistic Missile Non-Proliferation.'’ Disarmament
Diplomacy. Issue No. 54. February 2001. The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy.
<http://wwu.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd54/54smith.htm>
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Theorizing Missile Transfers from Chim a
Missile sale instance and volume serve as the dependent variables on vv hich
two distinct models of this study are based. This two-fold measure allows for a mor
complete view of China’s missile transfers. A time frame of 30 years was analyzt^'J to
take into account a number of factors, particularly the fall of the Soviet Union

and the end

of the Cold War in 1990. Consequently, the number of missiles imported by oth
of both
countries between 1980 and 2009 was analyzed in order to gain a clear picture
pre- and post-Cold War imports, Missile sales from Russia and Israel were also analy"^-"
to make the final analysis more robust and to look at competition between nations.

Hypothesis 1: China sells more missiles to countries with similar polity levels.
Hypothesis 2: China sells missiles morefrequently to countries with similcu polity

is concerned, Marshall
As far as the trends in polity changes and conflict data is
the
and State Fragility” using
published “Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance
number
Polity IV Project research data. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, he points out a
increase in
of trends that have emerged, including the decrease of armed conflicts and
the number of democracies since 1991.

Both of these factors will presumably affect

global missile transfers. According to Kinsella, the end of the Cold War brought with it a
worldwide decrease in arms transfers, though in recent years
47
increased.

trade has once a gain
also

According to Blanton, “linking democracy...to the transfer of arms may

46

Marshall, Monty G, and Benjamin R. Cole. Global Report 2009: Contlicl, Governance, and State
Fragility,
Center for Systemic Peace. 2009. 5, 1 1.
47
Kinsella, David. “Rivalry, Reaction, and Weapons Proliferation; A Time-Series Analysis ot >o a
Transfers. ” International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 46, No. 2(Jun., 2002). pp. 209-230. <
hup;//www.jstor.org/slable/3096069>
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enhance efforts to promote a more stable and peaceful world,

Blanton suggests it is

logical for the US to send missiles to democratic countries, thereby reducing the potential
49

for conflict.

One of the main theories explaining the connection between politics and conflict
is the democratic peace theory. The assumption that democratic nations are less likely to
go to war than autocratic nations forms the basis of this theory.^® The theoiy^’s premise
leads to the assumption that democratic nations are less likely to sell missiles to other
nations. However, when democratic nations do sell missiles, they are more likely to
prov ide other democratic nations with missiles, primarily as a deterrent against conflict,
as opposed to providing missiles to autocratic nations. On the other hand, the theory can
also be interpreted to suggest that autocratic nations are more likely to be involved in
conflict. Thus, autocratic nations are likely to provide other autocratic nations with arms.
Furthermore, democracies may either buy more missiles for deterrence purposes instead
of going to war. or democracies may buy fewer missiles because they do not utilize
missiles since they are more peaceful.
One of the main hypotheses ofthis research is that nations generally sell to nations
with a similar polity level. In other words, autocratic nations will sell to other autocratic
nations and democratic nations will sell missiles to other democratic nations. More
specifically, nations with polity levels similar to China’s polity level will consider China
as a potential missile supplier. Ostensibly, supplier nations will more often than not share
political ideology with recipient nations. Since China is an autocracy, theoretically China
will sell missiles to autocratic nations.
48

Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. “Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms
Exports.
'■ International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 49, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), pp. 650.
49
Ibid. 650.
50
Zinnes, Dinna A. "Constructing Political Logic: The Democratic Peace Puzzle. The Journal of C onjlict
Resolution." Vol. 48, No. 3 (Jun.. 2004). 430.
<http://ww\\ .istor.org/discover/10.2307/3176216?uid=3739760&uid=2l29&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3
739256&sid=21 101799050823 >
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Conflict variables must be taken into account to assess the drivers behind missile
sales. This paper quantifies conflict by examining contiguous nations invoK'ed in confiie
Ostensibly, nations bordering other nations in the midst of conflict vs ill seek to purchase
missiles. Bordering nations with dissimilar political regimes engage in conlliet frequentlyleading to an increase in missile

use. If polity level of a nation corresponds

\v/ilh China's
ial

polity level, and that state is involved in conflict, they will consider China as a potent
missile supplier. More conflict between nations natural 1>

increase of
leads to an

purchased weaponry.

Hypothesis 3: China sells more missiles to countries with contiguous countries in confhet.
Hypothesis 4: China sells missiles more frequently to countries with contiguous countries
engaged in conflict.

Economic factors also play a role in missile proliferation. Nations

with higher

GDPs will purchase missiles from China, as these nations have the financial resources to
with a
purchase arms. Among high-GDP nations, China will sell more missiles to nations
similar polity level.

missiles more
Hypothesis 5: Countries with higher GDPs are more likely to buy more
oftenfrom China than countries with lower GDPs.
Hypothesis 6: Countries with a low GDP per capita are more likely to buy more

missiles

more oftenfrom China than countries with a high GDP per capita.

On a global scale, being in the same region as one or more major episodes of
violence will lead to an increase in missile importation into that region. Since the Middle

20

East has the highest levels of conflict of all global regions. I theorize that more missiles
will be imported into that region as opposed to regions such as Latin America or Western
Europe.

Hypothesis 7: Countries in times or areas of high conflict potential import more missiles
more often and in larger volumes than countries not in times or areas of
high conflict potential.

Variables
The database used in this research is a conglomeration of several other databases
including the Missile Trade Registers of the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database compiled by
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Major Episodes of Political Violence
(MEPV) and Conflict Regions. 1946-2008 and Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800-2009 compiled by Monty G. Marshall at the Center of Systemic
51

Peace,

and population and GDP data from the World Development Indicators & Global
52

Development Finance report from the World Bank December 2010 report.
The main dependent variables analyzed are the number of missiles sold by China,
Russia/USSR, and Israel to various countries ten years prior to the fall of the Soviet
Union and twenty years afterwards, or in other words, 1980 to 2009, giving a total of
4,583 cases. The proliferation data was compiled from the SIPRI Arms Transfer
Database. The types of missiles vary widely, ranging from portable Surface-to-Air(SAM)
missile systems to BVRAAM (Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air) missiles.

Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research. Center for Systemic Peace
<http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>
”The World Bank. “GDP (Current US$r <http;//data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>
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variable span a number
The independent variables used to explain the dependent
ira l idcologv. national and
of categories, including economic and social condition, politica
international conflict level, and relevant historical events.
ic and social condition
A number of variables were included in the economic
indicators include GDP in
category in order to make the analysis more robust. I hese
fvlorcover, a GDP per capita

billions for each nation-year and population in millions

lalion of each nation
variable was calculated by dividing the total GDP by the total pop
for each year. Sherwin and Laurance stress that military

3 is not a reliable
expenditure

measurement of arms transfers, particularly in the Middle East

though analysis of

section of this thesis. A
military expenditure data and analysis is included in the second
data, including illegal

number of factors contribute to the lack of reliability of the

allocation of military
trafficking, unreliable figures on military spending, and unclear
53

resources.

ine the effect of political
Two main types of political variables are used to determine
ideology on missile proliferation. First, a thermometer of the

level of polity of 163 nations
IV: Political Regime

from 1800 to 2009 is included from the Polity Project
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009. The project Judges
major independent states in world, placing each nation on

the polity level of all

scale from -10 to +10, with -

10 indicating the highest level of autocracy and +10 indicating the highest
democracy in each year. The thermometer polity variable was
three-category ordinal variable separating each nation

then binned to create a

into one of three categories;

“autocratic”, “democratic”, and “mixed” for purposes of visualization and ease of

” Sherwin, Ronald G. and Edward J. [.aurance. “Arms Transfers and Military Capability. casunng an
Evaluating Conventional Arms Transfers.” huernational Studies Quarterly. Vol. 23, No. 3 (.. cp..
>). pp
360-389. < http://0-www.jstor.org.umiss.lib.olemiss.edu/stable/2600173>
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presentation. Dummy variables for each of the categories were created for use in a
logistic regression.
The third category of independent variables relates to international conflict. The
data comes from the MEPV database. The author MEPV database defines major episodes
of political violence as “systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized
«54

groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the course of the episode.
The database breaks conflict into seven different categories. The variables used in this
research include the number of bordering countries involved in any type of national or
international conflict, the number of conflicts of bordering countries, the total number of
conflicts in each region, and the number of conflicts of surrounding nations divided by
the number of bordering nations.
In transitioning from the USSR to the Russian Federation, Russia underwent
significant political and economic change, which affected global missile proliferation.
Globally, a significant change in the regime type of many nations occurred after the Cold
War. The number of global democracies increased in conjunction with a decrease in
global autocracies. A final dummy variable is a regional code, controlling for whether or
not the importer country is in the Middle East.
Some of the possible caveats of this research are unreported and illegal transfer of
weapons. Non-state actors were not accounted for in the SIPRI database and were
therefore not included in the analysis.

Marshall. Monty G. and Benjamin R. Cole. “Global Report 2009: Contlict, Governance, and State
r-'ragility.” Center for S>stemic Peace. 2009. 5. 11.
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Quantitative Analysis

General Trends:
C'hina. Israel.
This section provides a general overview oi missile exports irom
and Russia between 1980 and 2009. In this thirty-year time span
various types of missiles to nations across the globe. Israel

C'hina exported 17,857

ex ported 34-522 missiles and

Russia exported 126,117 missiles.
China, the
The sums of the total

number of missiles transferred

Irom
variables in the test

USSR/Russia, and Israel will serve as one of the baseline dependent
has generally
models. Since the 1980s, the number of missiles exported from Chi
decreased from year to year. A large decrease

occurred from the 1980s to

the 1990s. In

the 2000s has less
the 1980s, China sold 12,285 missiles. The decrease from the 1990s to
the 1990s, to
pronounced. The number of missiles China sold decreased from 3.555 in
2,017 in the 2000s.
international non-proliferation
Although Kay suggests China does not sign some
missiles after the
treaties and violates those it does sign, China sold significantly less
Cold War and during a period of time in which many non-proliferation
ratified. The following table shows the missile sales

before and after the Cold War.

Table 1: Missiles Sold During/After the Cold War Era
Total Received from Russia
Total Received from China
Cold War Bra

12610

73626

Post-Cold War
Bra

5247

52491

treaties were

Total Received from Israel
6129

28393

Conversely, the general decrease in missile exports out of China could suggest
China in fact does adhere to international treaties and non-proliferation ideology.
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In comparison, missile exports from the Soviet Union decreased drastically after
its transition to the Russian Federation. Missile transfers from Israel increased roughly
threefold from the 1980s to the 1990s. shown in the chart below.

Figure 1: Total Missiles Received from Israel, Russia, and China by Decade

Total Mssaes Received
from Israel
Total Mssiles Received
from RussiaAJSSR
Total MssBes Received
From China

400000-

\
300000-
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3 200000co

100000-

0T
1980s
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Decade

Russia, China, and Israel are three of the world’s largest missile providers. In the
observed time period, Russia exported nearly five times as many missiles as Israel and
almost ten times as many missiles as China.
In order to clarify the analysis in the theoretical model, the number of missile
transfers must also be taken into account. The following descriptive statistic table shows
the number of missile transfers from China, Israel, and the USSR/Russia from 1980 to
2009 and then breaks the sales down by decade in a means comparison.
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Table 2: Number of Missile Sale Transfers from China, Israel, and Russia by Decade
Decade

Missile Transfers from China

Missile Transfers from Israel

Missile I runslers Irom Russia

1980s

23

15

1237

1990s

16

25

1353

2000s

18

34

1403

57

74

3993

Total

The data shows that, over time, the actual instances of missile transfers from
China decreased from the 1980s to the 1990s but increased in the 2000s. Although the
number of transfer instances has fluctuated, the number of total missiles exported has
decreased, indicating that China is still supplying missiles to several nations,

but in

smaller volumes. The missile transfers from Israel have increased incrementally by
roughly ten more instances each decade. Likewise, the number of missiles exported by
Israel has increased over time. Not only is Israel exporting to a wider array ol recipients,
but also it is also supplying more missiles. The number of missile transfer instances from
the USSR/Russia increased steadily from the 1980s to the 2000s, but at a gradually
decreasing rate. However, the number of missiles exported decreased. Although Russia
increased the number of supply instances, the amount of missiles the country supplied
decreased. The following chart shows global missile transfers from China by region.
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Figure 2: Missile Sales from China to Other Regions
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Over half of missiles transfers by China during 1980 and 2009 were to nations in
the Middle East. If the theory that China sends missiles to nations with similar polity
levels is correct, then China will send missiles to regions with countries with a mean
autocratic polity level. T'he following chart shows each region in the left-hand column and
the mean polity score of that region in the right-hand column.
The following box plot shows the polity ranges and means for each region.
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Figure 3: Polity Score Range of World Regions
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The three regions with negative polity scores are therefore more likely than
regions with positive polity scores to receive missiles from China. As the means chart
shows, the Middle East, Africa, and the Former USSR territories have the highest
autocratic scores. The Middle East, Asia, and Africa are the largest importers of missiles
from China. The Middle East and Africa share polity scores similar to China’s score.
Conversely, the mean polity score among Asian nations is positive, so missile imports to
those nations from China could be due to another factor, perhaps proximity or trade
agreements.
Although Israel and China are two of the world’s largest missile suppliers, it is
clear the USSR/Russia engages in more transfer instances. The following sections delve
into the specific factors affecting missile proliferation.
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Social and Economic Factors
Population data and various measures of GDP were used to determine the general
effects of socioeconomic factors on volume and instance of missile transfers from China,
Russia, and Israel. These factors include a measure of total GDP, per capita GDP, and
population. The following chart shows the distribution of missile transfers from China
based on three categories of GDP over time.

Figure 4: Missile Volume of Missiles Received from China(Ln Sum)by GDP Range
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As the chart indicates, countries with higher GDPs not only import missiles more
frequently, but also import more missiles by volume than nations with lower GDPs
between 1980 and 2009. Poor nations imported missiles from China shortly before and
shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The following chart is a three
dimensional representation of the missile transfers from China in relation to GDP per
billion USD. The x axis shows the log change in missile imports while the z axis shows
29

the total GDP in billions in 2010 US dollars. Missile sales to high GDP nations increased
during the 2000s.

Figure 5: Volume of Missiles Received from China (Ln Sum) by GDP total (in Billions of
USD)between 1980 and 2008

Delving deeper into the data reveals less of a trend across nations in the relationship
between missile transfer instances and GDP per capita.

Table 3: Number of Missile Transfer Instances by Level of GDP per
Capita (1980-2009)
From Israel
From Russia
Level of GDP of Recipient Nation From China
Low GDP per Capita

23

7

1217

Moderate GDP per Capita

29

27

1220

High GDP per Capita

I

40

1225

30

Poorer nations importing missiles are more likely than richer nations to import
missiles from China. Israel's case is the opposite. Rich nations constitute over half of
missile imports from Israel. Nations across all three categories buy missiles from the
former USSR.'Russia. Next, the volume of missiles transferred in relation to GDP per
capita will be analyzed. The following descriptive table lists the amount of missiles sent
from China, Israel, and the USSR/Russia to nations with low, moderate, and high levels
of GDP per capita.

Table 4; Number of Missiles Sold by Level of GDP per Capita(1980-2009)
From Israel
From Russia
Level of GDP of Recipient Nation From China
l.ovv GDP per Capita

2133

4010

7646

Moderate GDP per Capita

13764

6943

62417

High GDP per Capita

60

23569

3437

Countries with moderate levels of GDP per capita imported a larger total volume
of missiles than the other categories of GDP per capita. However, the categories varied
widely among the three supplier nations. China and Russia supplied missiles to poorer
recipients whereas Israel provided missiles to richer recipients. Chinese missiles are
generally less sophisticated and cheaper than Israeli missiles or even Russian missiles,
and so countries with high GDPs almost never buy missiles from China whereas countries
with lower GDPs are more likely to consider China a potential missile supplier.
Interestingly, China and Israel sell many more missiles to nations with high GDPs as
opposed to Russia, which sells a large quantity to high GDP nations, but a larger quantity
to nations with moderate GDPs. Russia, China, and Israel sell relatively few missiles to
nations with low GDPs. It is likely these nations are concerned with other matters, or lack
the necessary capital, so they do not prioritize purchasing missiles. The following chart
shows the instance of missile transfers from the three supplier nations based on GDP
31

level. As GDP level increases, the instance of missiles sales from China and Israel
increase. Half of China’s missile transfer deals were with high GIW nations. Over 80% of
Israeli missile transfer instances were to high GDP nations. However the USSR/Russia
low. moderate, and
engaged in approximately equal amounts of arms transfers among
high GDP nations.
Breaking GDP per capita into three categories reveals

interesting results, fhe

following report shows the number of missiles transferred to nations with low' to high
Gross Domestic Products.

Table 5: Total Missiles Received by GDP Range (1980-2009)
From Russia
From Israel
Recipient Nation From China
Low GDP

715

130

3055

Moderate GDP

1555

2366

46502

13687

32026

23943

High GDP

The following chart shows the correlation between the number of missiles sold by
China to other nations with economic and social factors.

Table 6: Missile Sales Volumes from China and Socioeconomic Factors(1980-2009)
Ln of
Missiles from Ln GDP

China
.035*

Pearson Correlation
Ln of Missiles from
Sig,(2-tailed)
China
N

LnGDP

GDP per Capita

.022

GDP per
Capita

Ln of
Population in
Millions
121’*

-,053”
.001

.000

4180

4339

Pearson Correlation

,035*

,596"

.685'*

Sig.(2-tailed)

.022

.000

000

N

4258

4258

4180

4180

Pearson Coaelation

-.053“

.596“

1

023

Sig.(2-tailcd)

4583

001

4258

143

.000

N

4180

4180

4180

4180

Pearson Correlation

.12!

.685“

.023

1

.000

.000

143

4339

4180

4180

Ln of Population in
Sig (2-tailed)
Millions
N

4339

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-iailed).
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All of the above variables are statistically significant in relation to the natural log
of missiles exported by China. Both the natural log of population and GDP per capita are
significant at the 0.05 level and the natural log of GDP is significant at the 0.01 level. Per
capita GDP has a negative relationship with the volume of missile sales from China,

1

indicating that as GDP per capita increases, missile transfer amounts decrease. A similar
relationship is observed when comparing the three socioeconomic factors with the
instance of missile transfers from China.
I

Table 7: Socioeconomic Effects on Missile Sales From China
Dependent Variable = Number of Instances of Missile Sales from China
Pearson Correlation

Significance

N

LnofGDP

0.034*

.028

4258

GDP per Capita

-0.056**

.000

4180

.000

4339

0.127**
Ln of Population
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Again, total GDP and population variables show positive statistically significant
relationships with missile transfer instances from China, whereas GDP per capita has a
negative relationship with missile transfer instances. Therefore, as population and GDP
increases, missile transfer instances increase. However, as GDP per capita increases,
missile transfer instances decrease, which could indicate that nations with high GDP per
capita choose to buy more expensive and sophisticated missiles from other nations.
Socioeconomic factors thereby are shown to play a role in influencing not only the
volume of missile transfers, but also the number of instances ofarms sales.
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Conflict Factors
Due to the changing nature of global conHicl. missiles arc being

used more often

on the battlefield as well as a defensive deterrent against foreign aggression. A number of
conflict variables are used in this analysis to clarify the role of conflict in missile
’s conflict will be analyzed on the missile
proliferation. The role of bordering nation’s
proliferation first. Nations not involved in

conflict often import missile lor deterrence
times of war.

purposes as well as stockpiling weapons

for possible future warfare. During
will then be broken

it may be difficult to acquire missiles. The armed conflict category
into two distinct categories in order to examine more closely the effect of internal and
imi levels of border conflict
external conflict on the volume of missile transfers. Increasing
the effect of bordering
may not accurately explain the volume of missile transfers, so
of missile transfers,
nations involved in conflict will be used to examine the instances
countries not involved in a
As the chart below shows, most missiles were sold to
sold to nations
major episode of political violence(MEPV). Although 6,537 missiles were
issiles were sent to
bordering two nations involved in armed conflict, 6,500 of thos
extended war with Iraq.
Iran in 1982. During that time, Iran was in the midst of an
Likewise, in 1982, 6,930 missiles were

sent to Yugoslavia from the USSR and in 1980,

, both of which bordered
7,650 missiles were sent to Afghanistan from the Soviet Union
to be outliers in the
two nations in the midst of armed conflict. These three cases seem
of conflict. The following

chart is a

general trend of missile proliferation during times
visual breakdown of global missile sales based on bordering nations involved in any type
of conflict over time.
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Figure 6: Volume of Missiles Received from China (Ln Sum) by Number of Bordering
States in the midst of Major Episodes of Political Violence between 1980 and 2009.
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The chart shows countries with no bordering nations in conflict tend to import
high quantities of missiles and purchase missiles more frequently. This could be due to
nations building a defensive arsenal of missiles or that the nation is preparing for future
conflict. China sold nearly 6,612 missiles to nations involved in international conflict. Of
those 6,612, 6,500 were sent to Iran during the Iraq-Iran War. Consequently, Iran may be
an extraneous outlier and it seems countries involved in international conflict do not buy
missiles from China in large quantities.
Countries involved in internal conflict imported more missiles from China than
countries involved in international conflict. Thus, internal conflict is suspected to play a
larger role in missile transfer amounts. The following table shows the total number of
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missile transfer instances between 1980 and 2009 by China. Israel, and Russia to nations
with border nations in the midst of conflict.

Table 8: Number of Missile Transfers by Number of Bordering* States involved in Major
Episodes of Political Violence
China I ransl'crs

Recipient Nation
No Bordering Countries in MEPV

One Bordering Country in MEPV
Two Bordering
MEPV

Countries

More than 2 Countries in MEPV

Russia Iranst'crs

Sum

35

28

1715

% of Total Sum

61 4%

40 6°

44 7%

Sum

14

25

I 122

24.6%

36 2%

29 2%

5

9

579

H 8%

\ 3 0%

15 I O'O

Sum

3

7

422

% of fotai Sum

5.3%

10 1%
69

3838

% of fotal Sum

in Sum
% of Total Sum

57

Sum

Total

Israel I ran-sfers

I 1 0“o

As the number of conflicts of bordering states increases, the number of missile
sale instances from each of the three supplier nations decreases. The following bivariate
correlation shows the relationship between missiles transfers from C hma based on border
conflict.

Table 9: Border Conflicts and Natural Log of Missiles Received from China Crosstab

Pearson
Correlation
Ln of Missiles from China

Total Number of Border Wars
divided by Total Bordering
Nations

Number of Bordering States
with Any type of Armed
Conflict Range

Ln of Missiles from
China

Total Number of
Number of Bordering States
Border Wars
with Any type of Armed
divided by Total
Conllict Range
Bordering Nation.s

1

-.035*

-.038*

.027

.012

Sig.(2-iailed)
4583

4004

4412

N
Pearson
Correlation

-.035*

1

.779**
.000

Sig. (2-tailed) .027
4004
N
Pearson
Correlation

-.038*

4004

4004

.779’*

1

.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .012
4412
N

4004

4412

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
. Correlation is significant at the 0 01 level (2-tailed).

Two similar variables are used to make the analysis more robust. Phe independent
variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level and have a negative correlation with
the number of missiles imported from China. The following chart shows the comparison
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of missile transfers from Russia and Israel based on border conflicts. Thus, as the number
of countries with border conflicts increases, the number of missile imports by volume
decreases.

Correlation 1: Correlation between Conflict Factors and Missiles Received from Israel and
China

l oial Number
of Border Wars
di\ tded by Total
Bordering
Nations
Total Number of Border \\ ars
divided by Total Bordering
Nations
Number of Bordering Slates
with Any type of Armed
Conflict Range

Ln of Missiles from Israel

Ln of Missiles Received from
Russia

Pearson Correlation

I

000

Sig (2-iailed)
N
Pearson Correlation

Number of
Bordering
States wiili Any
type of Armed
Conflict Range
779‘*

4004
779“

Ln of
Ln of Missiles
Missiles from Received from
Russia
Israel
-.009

-.009

.575

.571

4004

4004

4004

1

.001

.015

Sig (2-tailed)

000

.923

.326

N

4004

4412

4412

4412

Pearson Correlation

-009

001

1

575

923

N

4004

4412

4583

4583

Pearson Correlation

-009

015

-.016

1

Sig (2-tailed)

571

326

.288

N

4004

4412

4583

Sig (2-tailedi

-.016
.288

4583

Correlation is significant at the 0 01 level (2-lailech

There is no statistical significance between the number of bordering countries
involved in conflict and the number of missiles received from Russia or Israel. Therefore,
border conflicts of recipient nations may only be an indicator of missiles supplied by
China.

Political Factors
Finally, the role of polity in determining missiles transfers will be analyzed. Two
main polity variables will be used: first, a three-category variable of regime type and
second, a thermometer of polity level. Again, the dependent variables to be analyzed are
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(1) the number and instance of missiles transferred from China, l;SSR/Kussia. and Israel:
and (2) the number of missile transfer instances from these three nations, liefore getting
into specifics about missile transfers, global trends in pol ity changes will be analyzed,
The chart above explains not only the change in

the number ot autocratic, mixed,

and democratic nations, but also shows an increase in the number ot nations between
1980 and 2009. Over half of the nations in the world were autocracies in the 1980s but
Likewise, the number of
by the end of the 2000s, half had converted to democracies
democracies approximately doubled after the 1980s to the 2000s. The following line
graph shows China’s polity score between 1980 an
polity level over these years as

d 2009. No change occurred in China's

China remained at a polity score of negative 6.
belw'een 1980

The following line graph shows the global trends in regime change
and 2009.

in Political Regimes between 1980 and 2009
Figure 7: Global Change in
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After the fall of the Soviet Union, autocratic regimes began converting to
democratic regimes and the number of democracies increased due to the breakup of the
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former Soviet Union. The sales of missiles from autocratic nations to democratic may
show a comple.x relationship in\ol\ ing not onl\ the fall of communism but also the
increasing number of democracies. Thus, an independent t-test is needed to determine the
mean change in polity between decades.
I.cvcncs Test
lor I qualilN
ol V ariances l-lcsi tor l qiialit\ o! Means
95“0

Confidence
Internal of the
DttTerence

Rcvi.sed Lqual
POLITY variances
Score
assumed

I

Sig

4 I 958

000

t

df

Sig
Mean
Sid I'rror
i2tailed) nilTerencc DitTcrcncc Lower Upper

2951

000

-5 446

269

-3 973 -2 919

2797 854 000

-3 446

,270

-3 976 -2 916

12 820

liqual
variances
not
assumed

I 2 746

i.evene’s Test for

of

1-quality
Variances

t-test for LqualitN of Means
95%
Confidence
Interval
of
the
Difference

Revised
POLITY
Score

Hqual
variances
assumed
Equal
variances not
assumed

F

Sig

37 728

000

t

df

Sig (2- Mean
tailed) DilTerence

3142

000

-I 375

240

-I 845

-905

3 I 20 780 000

-I 375

240

-1 846

-905

Std
Krror
DilTerence
L.ower

Upper

5 735

5 733

The independent t-tests show that there is a statistically significant relationship between
each decade and the global mean polity score. During the 1980s, the mean polity score
was negative. During the 1990s and 2000s. the mean polity score was positive. The
means comparison shows the total number of missiles sold by China to various regime
types globally. The mean change from the 1980s to the 1990s was greater than the mean
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change from the 1990s to the 2000s. It is clear the change in decades inHuenced missiles
missile sales from China.
transfers, rejecting the null hypothesis that time has no efleci on
The following chart shows the amount ol' missiles

sold based on political regime

type. Political regime is separated into three categories based on polity level. China and
imateK beiueen 75% and 80% of
the former USSR/Russia both sent between approx
Israel sent almost 80% of its missile
missiles by volume to autocratic nations, whereas
of this trend over time.
sales by volume to democratic nations. A logical implication
. is that Israel would be expected to increase
following the global trend of democratization
missiles sales, whereas conversely, China

and the USSR-^RLissia would be expected to sell

fewer missiles.

T,hlP in: Missile Sales Volume byj^oli^
From Israel
From China
Polity of Recipient
4954
14014
Autocratic
Mixed

1910

2384

Democratic

1483

27184

ReeimeType: 1980-2009
l-rom USSR- Russia
373766
15451
1 16397
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Figure 8: Volume of Missiles Received from China (Ln Sum) by Nations with Autocratic,
Mixed, and Democratic Polity Levels between 1980 and 2009
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The year 1992 marks a transition year in China's arms transfer pattern, in which China
sold 12 missiles to Bangladesh. In 1991. China sold missiles to Bangladesh, which is the
same year Bangladesh transitioned to a democracy.
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However, by 1991, Bangladesh was

already an established purchaser of Chinese missiles, having purchased more than 400
missiles from China between 1982 and 1989.
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Since 1991, Bangladesh has again

purchased more than 400 missiles from China. In 1992, China began shifting its missile
sales from autocratic nations to democratic nations. Around the same time, some
autocracies began transitioning to democracies.
After the Cold War, the number of democracies and mixed political regimes
drastically increased while the number of autocracies slightly decreased. The following
three-dimensional bar graph shows the trends in missile sales from China based on the
55

Marshall. Mont> G. "Authority Trends. 1972-2010: Bangladesh. Polity IV Project; Political Regimes
Characteristics and I'ransitions. 1800-2011. <htip://\vvv\v.syst emicpeace.org/polity/bng2.htm>
“Transfers of major con\ cniional weapons: sorted by recipient. Deals with deliveries or orders made for
year range 1980 to 2009." SlPRl Arms Transfer Databa.se.
<http://armslradc.sipri.tirg/armslrade/page/trade register.php>
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lo aiilocraiic nations
recipient nation's polity score. Although, China sold primaril>
China heuan to sell to nations
during the Cold War, after the fall of the Soviet Union
with more democratic polity scores,

China continued to sell missiles to previous
change.

purchasers, regardless of whether they underwent a polic>
> 1980 lo 2009
bv Polit y Score
Figure 9: Volume of Missiles Received from China (Ln Sum) o.
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and a linear regression
The final section of the analysis includes a logistic reg
analyzing the correlation

between

the

ic,
socioeconomic.

independent variables the volume of missile

sales

from

political,
China.

correlation was calculated to determine the possible signilicance
transfers from China, Israel, and USSR/Russia.
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and
First,

conflict
a

as

bivariate

o f polity to missile

Correlation 2: Correlation between Polity Scores and Missile Sales from China, Israel, and
Russia
Revised
I n of Missiles
l’( )l n Score from China
Pearson
C\>rreIalion
Sig (2-lailed)

Ln of Missiles from Israel

Ln of Missile Received
from Russia

Ln of Missile Received
from Russia

070"

-no'

oo:

000

.000

4516

4516
.023

- 046”

Revised P01.H Y Score

Ln of Missiles from
China

Ln of Missiles
from Israel

N

4510

4516

Pearson
Correlation

- 046"

I

041
005

.112

45S.3

4583

4583

1

-.016

●Sig (2-lailed>

002

N

4516

Pearson
C'orrelalion

070*'

041

Sig (2-tailed I

000

005

N

4516

4583

4583

4583

Pearson
Correlation

- 1 10"

023

-016

1

Sig (2-tailed)

000

112

288

N

4516

4583

4583

.288

4583

Correlation is signitlcant at the 0 01 level (2-tailedi

The chart above reflects a statistically significant correlation between the natural
logs of the missiles received from each of the selected suppliers at the 0.01 significance
level. This indicates the recipient nation's polity level affects the volume of missile
purchased from suppliers. China and the USSR7Russia are likely to provide missiles for
countries with negative polity levels whereas Israel is more likely to provide a larger
volume of missiles to countries w ith positive polity levels.
To justify these results, the instances of missile transfers need to be compared
with the polity levels of each of the three supplier nations, which are shown in the
bivariate correlation on the next page.

4.3

Correlation 3: Correlation between Polity Score and Instances
China, Israel, and Russia

Insunccs ol'
Instances of Missile
Missilo Saio from Sales from Russia
Israel

Revised POLITY Instances ol Missile
Sales Irom China
Score

Revised
POLITY Score

Were Missiles
Received from
China?

Were Missiles
Received from
Israel?

V/ere Missiles
Received from
Russia?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig (2-tailed)
N

4516

Pearson
Correlation

-.041

Sig.(2-taiIed)
N
Pearson
Correlation

.006

Sig.(2-lailed)

.000

N
Pearson
Correlation

4516

Sig.(2-tailed)
N

,001

4516

of Missile Transfers from

- 048

- 04)

070

006

000

001

45 16

45 16

017

000

254

I 000

4516

4583
017

,070'*

4583

458.1

1

- 007
653

-.048*'

4516

,254

4583

4583

4583

- 007

.000

.653

1 ,000

4583

4583

4583

**
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailcd)_—- eianincanl relationship between polity score
The correlation'7^fb^i^T»7cally s.gn.I.ca
nations at the 0.01 level. As
each of the three supplier
and instances of missile sales from
are less likely
, China and the USSR/Russia
polity score of the recipient nation increases
exem pliried by the negative relationship between
to supply that nation with missiles, as
from China and Russia. Conversely, a positive
polity score and instances of missile sales
from Israel and polity score, which
relationship exists between instance of missile sales
autocratic nations.
indicates Israel is less likely to sell missiles to

Final Models
Four different models show

the

influence

of sets

of aggregating

factors

iniz linear and logistic regressions. The first
influencing missile transfers from China using
social, political.
two models use linear regressions to analyze the relationship of various
issile transfer volumes. The second
economic and conflict independent variables and m
two models show the influence of these factors on
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missile transfer instances.

Model I
Model 1 shows ihc innuonce of several baseline key factors in determining if
missiles were received from China b> nation R. The following linear regression shows a
culmination of the relationships of political, socioeconomic, and conflict factors in
determining missile transfer volume from China. The regression analysis shows each of
the independent v ariables is siatisticallv significant when determining missile sale volume
from China from 1980 to 2009. GDP per capita, polity, and conflict measurements all
show negative relationships whereas total GDP shows a positive relationship. Overall,
about 1.5% of the variation is attributable to the.se factors.
Thus, the follow ing model can be used to as a prediction model for determining
the natural log of missiles received from China by a particular nation with varying levels
of GDP per capita, GDP. Politv Score, and average number of wars of bordering
countries. The model is as follows:
Number of missiles received from China ^ fio -t- fiiln(GDP)
^fi2(GDP per capita)
^fiifPolity Score)
+fi4(Niimber ofBorder IVars divided by Total Bordering Nations)
Results of Model 1
Analysis of the model yields the following prediction model for assessing the natural log
of missiles received from China by other nations:
Ln of missiles receivedfrom China = .029+(.032*Ln GDP)
-

(.006*GDP per capita)
(.005*Polity Score)
(.057"^average border wars of bordering countries)

4.^

Model II
Model II takes into account whether the receiving counirv is in ilic Middle i.ast.
The Model II regression shows that each of the independent \

ariables i n Model 1
missile sales is

are stili statistically significant, but the most important factor driving
eoiintrics in the
whether or not the receiving country is in the Middle I.ast. 1 liLrclore.
Middle East are likely to receive a higher volume of missile

than eountries not in the

Middle East. The model is as follows:
-V

Number ofmissiles receivedfrom China ’fi,

fiihuGDF)

+fi2(GDP per capita)
■^fii(Polity Score)
divided by Total Bordering Nations)

+ fi^fNumber of Border Wars

+ fis(Is recipient in the Middle East?)
Results of Model II
Statistical analysis of Model II yields
natural log of missiles received from

the following prediction

m odel for assessing the

China by other nations:

, i^aiural log ofMissiles receivedfrom Chin

^ n 22-(.056'^horder wars/horder countries). .
Polity Score) + (.llS^Is

msonn of GDP)-(.006^GDP per capHa)'(0U2
recipient in the Middle East?)
About 1.8% of the variation can be explained by Model II.
The following chart gives a summary

of the Model I and II regress
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ion.

Model 1
C'oet'lleietu

Linear Rci^reNsitms
i'.xplanaUM') \’ariablcs

Model II
Coeft'icieni

Natural I .og id'(iI)!'

(Signitleanee) (Significance)
.050**

GDP per Capita

(.000)
-.006**

(.000)
-.006*’*"’

(.000)
_,00S**'

(.000)
-.005*

(.00n_ ____
-.057’*’
(0.042)
N ,\

(.054)
-.056*
{.046)
-1 I
(.000)
4583
.018

Revised IH)I . I 1

Seore

Total Border \\ ar.s Border
Coil ntries
Is Recipient in llic Middle I asi?

—c

k- —

Numbvn- oTObseiN ations

f

4583

i d) 1 5

R-Sqiiare
"^Signil'ieant at the 0.05 le\el
¥’t'Sitiiii I leant at the ().0 1 le\ el

Model HI
Model 111

iabics used in Model 1. hut uses
includes the same independent \ari

a logistic

missile sale took place in a given country-year.
to ianal)/e whether a
the instance ol
ic regression shosss signi iieant relationships beiuecn
The logisoc
ita and total GDPC'hina and the economic laetors of GDP per capita
missile sales from
. Other than
: are not statisticalb’ significant
confliet
factor
and
polit>'
seore
the
However,
lationships with
the other independent \ a,-iabics all sluns negative re
GOP^
the total
in the relationship can
China to other nations. 2.3°o of the variation m
■ansfer froin
missile t'
these four laetors.
ble
is
be attribute
● instances
and
missile
iranstci
the relationship between polity
Allhougb
factors
most i mportant
re.'lalionship. I be
ically ^igiiiPeanl. it stil l shows a negative
statistic

regression

w liether or not missiles were imported trom C hina appeal
deteriTiiti"''^
. 'p he logi^bc regicssion moilel lesietl is as lolliuvs:
econoi'nieP(Logged Oddsol Naiion X
f/:

r ('

iny M|!,s,ik!s liou\ t'hiua\" |ii '

ainia,

I /

^fiifPolily Scorej
■r P4(Number of Bonhr Wars dividccl hv Total Honlcriii^ Salionst
Results of Model 111
Statistical analysis of Model III yields the following prediction model for assessing the
logged odds of whether Nation X received missi les Irotn China:
Logged Odds = -4.692-(polity2*.029)-(I
\umhcr of Bonier Wars divided by Total
Bordering Nalionsj-(.514 *GDP per capita) ■ (.56! * natural log of (WOT)
The predictive results for ifNation X received missiles fh)tn C hina is:
wars border
coimtries)border
Probability=Exp(-‘/.(592-C/7o//Vy2 ^.029)-( I A)5H^
(.5I4*GDP per capita) v (.561 *natural log of (I DP)) d ' (~d b92~(polity2*.029P
(I.058*Number of Border Wars divided by Total Bordering Saiioos)-(.514"*GDP per
capita) + (.56l^naiural log of GDP))

Model IV
The final model takes into account the same independent variables used in Model
II, and apply those factors to instances of missile sales from China, while specifically
focusing on missile transfers to recipient nations in the Middle East.
In addition to the factors in Model

III,

the

Model

IV

regression shows a

statistically significant relationship at the O.OI between missile transfer instances from
China and with “Is the recipient nation in the Middle East?". The magnitude of “Is the
recipient nation in the Middle East?" is positive and relatively high, indicating that
t
●
.^iccilcs than nations not in the
countries in the Middle East arc more likely to receive missn*-^
Middle East. Overall. 2.6% of the variation can be c.xplaincd using these independent
variables.
The following model was analyzed:
P(Logged Odds of Nation X receiving Missiles Irom China)

' Piln(GDP)

efi2(GDP per capita)
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■^fisfPolity Score)
fi4(Nuniher o f Border Wars divided by Total Bordering Nations)
+ fisds recipient in the Middle East?)

Results of Model IV
Statistical analysis gives the following results:
Logged odds of whether missiles were received from China = -4.800+(.558*Natural Log
of GDP)-(.608*GDP per Capita)-).006*polit}' score)-.875*Total Border Wars/Bordering
countriesj-r{l.347*Is R in the Middle East)

Logistic Regressions
Explanatory Variables

Model III
Coefficient

Natural Log of GDP

(Significance)
.561**

Model IV
Coefficient
(Significance)
.558**

GDP per Capita

(.000)
-.514**

(.000)
-.608**

Revised POLITY Score

(.000)
-.029**

(.000)
-.006*

Total Border Wars/Border Countries

G219)
-1.058*

Is Recipient in the Middle East?

(0.051)
N/A

1.347**

4583
.023

(.000)
4583
.026

Number of Observations
R-Square
*Significant at the 0.05 level
Significant at the 0.01 level

im

-.875*

Discussion and Conclusion
This work bridges a gap between historical and quantitative explanations for
missile proliferation, as well as a gap between statistical analysis and intelligence
analysis. The results support some of my hypotheses and disprove others.
As expected, economic factors play a key role in determining missile transfers
from China. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and consequent global
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r
democratization trend, China began selling missiles to democratic nations in 1992, while
sales to autocratic nations declined after 1992. China sold tnissilcs to nations with
relatively high GDPs, indicating these nations have siirilcicnt llnancial resources to
dedicate to offensive/defensive missile purchases. Nations with low CiDPs per capita (a
characteristic generally indicative of developing nations and most autocratic nations)
were more likely to buy missiles from China than nations w ith high CiDPs per capita.
Polity level affects volume of missile transfers from China between 1980 and
2009 albeit polity plays a smaller role than economic faclt)rs. Countries with negative
polity scores not only purchased more missiles from
often from China, As predicted, China

China. thc> purchased missiles more

indeed sent more missi les more often to autocratic

nations and countries with a similar polity level. 1 herefore. the first hypothesis was not
. China did
disconfirmed. The analysis of the data did not support the second hy pothesis
not send missiles more often to autocratic nations, as w as expected. In the 1980s, China
sold missiles more
sell missiles to

often to autocratic nations. Among the observed years, China did not

democratic nation until 1991. Sales to Bangladesh constitute most of

China’s missile sales to democracies. In 1991. Bangladesh transitioned from an autocracy
to a democracy. By then, however, Bangladesh was already one of China’s main missile
purchasers

These sales to Bangladesh skew the data somewhat, which could account for
between the expectations for hypothesis 2 and the findings. Furthermore,

the disparity
following the

democratization trend in the 1990s, the pool of potential buyers with polity

levels similar to the PRC shrank, leading China to sell missiles to more democratic
nations.
The independent variable in hypotheses 3 and 4. the conflict level of each nation,
does not appear
involvement

to play a statistically significant role in determining the role of conflict

of a nation’s bordering countries on missile imports from China. The results
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of the analysis disproved both h\ pothesis 3 and 4. Although China exports fewer missiles
to a nation as the number of border stale conflicts around that nation increases, this is just
one measure of how conflict affects missile transfers. Being contiguous to a nation in
conflici seems to be a disincentive for missile purchases. Nations in the midst of conflict
could consider missile purchases of a bordering state as a threat, thereby exacerbating
relations between the two nations, and could possibly lead to a security dilemma and
subsequent arms race. Of course, these are merely speculative possible reasons that
nations that are contiguous w ith states in the midst of conflict generally do not purchase
large volumes of missiles. Other factors should be taken into account, including the
conflict level of the region.
Based solely on the bordering conflict factor, China exports missiles to countries
not bordered by nations in conflict. Thus, Hypothesis 5 and 6 were not disconfirmed. The
data show that nations contiguous to states in conflict are less likely to stockpile missiles
than nations whose contiguous nations are not involved in conflict. Rather, when a nation
A’s bordering states are at peace, nation A is more likely to buy missiles than when
nation A’s bordering states are at war. Perhaps if nation A were to buy missiles when
contiguous nations were at war, it would incite an arms race, with contiguous nations
viewing nation A's arms amassment as a threat.
This research shows that as GDP increases, nations are more likely to buy missiles
from China. On the other hand, as GDP per capita increases, nations are less likely to buy
missiles from China. Countries in the Middle East received more missiles, more often
from other countries in the world. The Middle East is an area with a large conflict
potential given the presence of unstable regimes. Many nations in the Middle East have
high GDPs, due to the lucrative oil trade; though they generally have low GDPs per
capita. The economic monocultures in the Middle East feel more threatened to
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encroachments on territory and resources as opposed

to nations with

diversified

economies. Shutting down oil production in an oil-dependent nation is economically
much more devastating than shutting down oil production in a nation with a diversified
economy.
Models II and IV show countries in the Middle l-!ast tend to bu> more missiles
more often. Simply being in the Middle Hast grcatK increases the probability of a nation
receiving missiles from China. The data from the Iraq-lran war does not skew these
results. Between 1980 and 2009, China also sold missiles to Pakistan. I:g> pi- Bangladesh.
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.
The low R-square found in each of the models leads to the assumption that there
are

many

underlying

unobservable

and

idiosyncratiic

factors

affecting

missile

proliferation. Thus, these models cannot be used to predict future proliferation. It is also
possible there are factors not included in this analysis.
This research is just the tip of the iceberg in
i determining underlying reasons
behind China’s missile transfers to other nations. Future exploits might narrow down each
factor into more robust and thorough analyses of varying m easLires of socioeconomic,
political, and conflict factors affecting missile transfers. The models show that although
political and conflict factors play a role in explaining missile proliferation, economic and
regional factors are more salient.
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National Intelligence Estimate: Qualitative Section
Scope Note
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) portion of this paper assesses Iran’s
missile capabilities, w hy Iran purchased missiles from China and implications for the next
five years, assesses China as a continuing proliferator of missiles and related technology,
and discusses implications of Sino-lranian missile sales for US security interests.
The Estimate focuses on the following questions;
1 . What factors will play a role in China’s decisions to sell arms and related
technology?
2. Will Iran continue to rely upon China as a source of missiles and missile
technology?
3. What are the potential capabilities of Iran’s missiles in the next five years?
This Estimate incorporates open source information available as of 3 March 2013.
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Key Judgments
●

desire for economic profit
We judge with high confidence that the PRC's
has sold
drive their missile and missile technology proliferation. China
order to establish and gradual!} increase
arms to the Middle East in
economic ties with these nations,

Statistical anahsis shows the PRC sells

missiles to countries with relatively high GDPs, but low GDPs per capita,
such as Iran. Nations with higher GDPs have
spend on missiles. We judge with high con

more financial resources to

fidence that although polity
inHuential.

influences missile proliferation, economic factors prove more

indicates that China sells missiles to nations
The quantitative analysis of this paper
with high GDPs, but to low GDPs per
Iran’s GDP was the

capita. According to

largest globally m
57

capita lagged at 97'" place ($13,100).

the CIA World Faclbook,

2012 ($997.4 billion), but Iran's GDP per
to China. In

In 201 I. 1/5'" of Iran's exports were
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total imports.
the same year, imports from China comprised roughly 17.4% of Iran's
However, the number of missiles sold to Iran by

China has gradually decreased since the
miissile

production capability. In

1980s. This is likely due to Iran’s developing indigenous
technology to produce
the 1980s, Iran possessed neither adequate infrastructure nor
missiles domestically, and therefore relied on

imported missiles. According

to Dr. John

Chipman, Director General and Chief Executive of the International Institute for Strategic
Services, Iran began developing an indigenous ballistic missile program in the early
59

2000s, namely in order to become independent of foreign sources of missiles.

Iran. CIA World Faetbook, < https://www.cia.gOv/:ibrary/publications/the-world-lactbook/geos/ir.html>
Ibid
Press Statement." 10 May 2010.
Chipman, John. “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A net assessment
<htlp://wmv.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/irans-ballistic-missilc-capabilities/press-staiement/>
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China sees arms transfers as a conduit for expanding trade with Middle Eastern
nations, as evidence b\ the examples of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Affidi and Bajoria
suggest China established relations with Pakistan in the 1950s, initially seeing one
60

another as a “strategic hedge” against India. China began providing weapons to Pakistan
in the 1960s. The authors assess that Pakistan has both short-range and medium-range
ballistic missiles that are “modifications of Chinese imports” and obtained “nuclear
61

technology and assistance” from the PRC. In the 1980s, China sold between thirty-six
and fifty CSS-2/DF-3 IRBMs to Saudi Arabia.^" Yoel Guzansky, research fellow at the
Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, suggests Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
have formed a strategic partnership to curb Iran's influence in the region. One the one
hand. Saudi Arabia's weapons production infrastructure remains relatively undeveloped,
but has a steady flow of income; on the other hand, Pakistan has both the infrastructure
63

and required technology to produce nuclear weapons.

●

We judge wdth high confidence that nations will seek to obtain missiles
and missile technology from other sources following the decline of
Russia's role in the arms trade. China and North Korea are sources of
relatively cheap weapons and weapons technology that nations are likely
to consider as potential arms providers. For Iran, China is a particularly
valuable ally in its political, economic, and military pursuits.

60

Afridi. Jamal and Jayshree Bajoria. “China-Pakistan Relations."6 July 2010. Council on Foreign
Relations.
<htlp://vv\\\v.cfr.org/china/china-pakistan-relations/pl0070> Accessed 21 April 2013.
61
Ibid.
62
“Transfers of major conx enlional weapons: sorted by recipient. Deals with deliveries or orders made for
year range 1980 to 2009." SIPRl Arms Transfer Database.
<http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/pagc/tradc register.php>
63
Guzansky. Yoel. “Questioning Riyadh's Nuclear Rationale." Middle East Quarterly 20.2(2013): 59-64.
Political Science Complete Accessed 21 April 2013.
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Iran and China are mutually invested in the other's success. China plays a crucial
role in developing Iran’s missile arsenal and aspirations to become a nuclear weapon
possessing state.
China sees Iran as a key source of oil and a potential market in

\s hich to sell its

in Iran is a win-win scenario, olten characterized in
products. For China, investing in
Chinese literature as a “XXim” {shuangyin^) or

●’dual-win" relationship. Iran's oil satiates

China’s need for fossil fuels, while Iran’s population provides potential customers for
China’s expanding market. Iran gains a powerful po
ally that forces the United States to con

litical ally from the relationship, an

stantly evaluate foreign policy. Iran can sell vast

. and in return
quantities of oil to China , allowing China to secure it s economic prosperity, c
buy China’s cheap missiles and related technology.

●

We judge with moderate confidence that Iran will depend on

China for

missile related technologies, and China may play a covert role in helping
I ran’s reach its goal of an indigenous nuclear program

, if the PRC decides

to help Iran attain nuclear weapons at all.

Given recent sanctions, China will

find directly transferring arms to

increasingly more difficult, and may choose to use

Iran

North Korea as a conduit for arms

transfers, China has historically helped other nations develop nuclear weapons, notably
Pakistan and North Korea.
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Carver asserts that China’s geopolitical gains ‘‘from a

nuclear Iran simply outweigh the losses to China from further fraying of the NPT
regime.
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The PRC views Iran as a political, economic, and military stronghold

in the

^ Garver, John W. “Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran?” The Washington Quarterly. Winter 201 1. 34:1.
75-85
Ibid 80
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Middle East. According to Chinese sources, increasing relations with Iran will bolster
future diplomac> with other nations in the Middle East. At the same time, solidifying
66

relations w ith Iran would secure China's energ> needs.

Nonetheless. China w ill have to balance its arms trade relationship with Iran and
with responsibilities of being a world power on the UN Security Council. The PRC views
Iran as an important source of oil and natural gas, as well as a market for selling arms. If
Iran were to pursue a nuclear weapons program. China could be a primary supplier of
materials and related technology. However, supplying arms comes with a cost. According
to Wu Lei, a professor at Yunnan University's International Relations Research Institute,
China's growth and development depends on oil. Since China satisfies its oil demands
primarily by bu> ing from Middle Eastern suppliers, China’s economic security depends
upon political stability in the Middle East. Wu Lei suggests the structured energy
cooperation plan betw een China and the Middle East already has significance, though the
67

nations lack energ> security cooperation.

Securing stability and peace in the Middle

East is in line with the PRC's two-fold Middle East strategy. First, China wants to secure
the influx of oil from the Middle East. Second, China seeks to enter the markets new
markets in the Middle East. Helping Iran obtain nuclear weapons would be detrimental to
China’s plans for expansion and security in the Middle East. If China helps Iran develop
an independent indigenous missile MRBM and LRBM production base, then China will
no longer be able to continue to sell MRBMs and LRBMs to Iran. Thus, from an
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2009. 71-76. Chen .lun Hua. New Chinese-lranian Strategic Positioning Relationship Analysis. XiNan
University. Associate Professor in the Center oflranian Studies. 10 February 2009. 71-79.
67
January 2007. Wu Lei.
Chinese-Middle Fiastern Knergy Relations Development Contemplation,
World Studies. January 2007.
<http;//www.google.corn/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=l&ved=OCDUQFjAA&url=http%
3A%2F%21-research.shisu.edu.en%2l picturc%2Farticle%2F33%2Fef%2Fba%2F51fe76294a5bb2823bca4
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economic standpoint, it behooves China to limit Iran's indigenous production capabilities,
thereby continuing Iran’s dependence on foreign sources ofmissilcs.

●

We judge with moderate confidence that Iran wi l l be unable to develop a
nuclear-capable ballistic missile in the next five years without extensive
cooperation with a nuclear weapon state.

According to Karp, stales can spend five to ten years to develop a nuclear warhead
68

capable ballistic missile after a state s nuclear test.

Seeing as though Iran has yet to test

missile arsenal will not be capable of
a nuclear weapon, according to Karp s logic. Iran s
ia ballistic missile for at least five years. However, it the
delivering a nuclear warhead via PRC assists Iran in developing such

warhead, this timeframe could potentially shorten
Iran's

significantly. According to a report published by the Arms Control Association,
“strategic missiles” program is “emerging more

slowly than previously projected, if they

,69

are emerging at all.
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Aaron. Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and 7echnics. 1996. 179-185.
■ Threat
rheilmann, Greg, “Iran’s Missile Program and Its Implications lot U.S. Missile Defence.
Assessment Brief. Analysis on Effective Policy Responses to Weapons-Related Security 1 hreais. 5
February 2013. 1-2. < hUp://www.armscontroLorg/lhreals/Irans-Missile-Program-and-!ts-implicalions-lbrUS-Missile-Defcnse>
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Discussion

Iran's Military ^Expenditure Historj*
Analysis of SIPRl's Military Expenditure Database shows Iran’s military
expenditures increased from slightly less than $2 billion (2010 USD) in 1988. peaked at
$13.5 billion (2010 USD) in 2006. and decreased to nearly the approximate military
~0

spending level of Iran in 2000.

Figure 10: IMilitary Expenditures of Iran: 1988-2008(in Billions of 2010 USD)
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A higher ratio between military expenditure and GDP indicates that a nation dedicates
larger amount of resources to military buildup or maintenance. Thus, though Iran’s
military spending peaked in 2006 at roughly the equivalent $14 billion USD to the
military in 2006, military spending comprised less than 3.5% of Iran’s total GDP.

70

SIPRI Military I xpenditurc Databa.sc. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
http://milcxdata.sipri.org
59

Figure 11: Iran’s Militarj Expenditures as a Percentage of C»I>P: 1988-2008
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At the end of the Iraq-lran War, military spending conslituicd approximately 2%

of Iran’s GDP. Military spending as a percentage of GDP peaked in 2001 at almost 4%,
but fell sharply in 2002. Military spending as of 2008 was roughly the same level as
spending twenty years earlier in 1988. Missile purchases comprised a fraction of Iran’s
total military expenditure.
Compared to nations near or bordering Iran, Iran contributes a relatively low
percentage of GDP to military spending. The following table compares the estimate 2012
GDP and military spending as a percentage of GDP of nations bordering or close in
proximity to Iran.
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Table 11: Estimated 2012 GDP and Most Recent Militar>' Expenditures of Nations
Bordering Iran
Militar>’ Expenditures
Year of Mil.
GDP(2012 Estimate in as a Percentage of
GDP
2012 USS. in millions)
Country’
Expenditure %
Saudi Arabia

657.000

10

2005

Iraq

130.600

8.6

2006

Israel

249.900

7.3

2006

Syria

64.700

5.9

2005

T urkey

1.125.000

5.3

2005

Egypt

255.000

3.4

2005

T urkmenistan

47.550

3.4

2005

Pakistan

230.500

.●>

2007

Armenia

18.950

2.8

2010

Azerbaijan

71,040

2.6

2005

Iran

483.300

2.5

2006

Afghanistan

33.550

1.9

2009

(Source: CIA World l actbook <https:' \\wav.cia.gov/library/publ ications/the-\vorId-factbook/index.html>)

Saudi Arabia spends nearly 1/10“’ of its GDP on its military, four times what Iran
spends on its military as a percentage of GDP. Although Iran’s military spending as a
percentage of GDP remains relatively low, Iran's GDP is higher than most nations in the
Middle East, so Iran has resources to increase military spending if the leaders of the
Islamic Republic feels threatened.
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Figure 12: Iran’s Military Expenditures on Missiles: 1980-2009 (in millions of 2010 USD)
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Iran’s military spending on missiles peaked in 1986 and 1987, at the end of the
Iraq-Iran war. Spending on missiles spiked again in the early !990s. around the time of
the Gulf War. Spending then decreased substantially from 1994 to 2005. In 2006. Iran
began purchasing missiles again, possibly related to the 2006 Lebanon-flezbollah
conflict. According to Kreps, Hezbollah was “able to galvanize support from the Shia
.71

Iranians” by portraying the conflict as a “pan-Islamic fight against Israel.

Speigel and

King write that the nearly 4,000 missiles used by Hezbollah to bombard Israel came from
72

Syrian and Iranian sources.

In recent years, inefficiency has plagued Iran’s economy. Estimates show that, in
2012, Iran ran a budget deficit of 5%. Industrial production in Iran decreased by nearly
2.7% in the same year.^^ Unemployment and inflation in Iran remain high. However,
despite Iran’s recent economic downturn, according to a DefenseNews report published in
February 2012, Iran’s Ahmadinejad said he planned to "more than double military
74

spending” in the next year.

In the 2012 fiscal year, which ended in March, Iran’s

71

Kreps, Sarah E.“The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned.” Parameters. Spring 2007. 9.
Speigel, Peter and Laura King. “Israel Says Syria, Not Just I ran. Supplied Missiles to Hezbollah.” Los
Angeles Times. 3\ August 2006. <hUp://articles.latimes.com/2006/aug/3 l/world/lg-he/.bollah3 1>
74 Iran, CIA World Faetbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/lhe-world-ractbook/geos/ir.hti-nl
Iran Plans 127 Percent Defense Budget Increase,” DefenseNews. 2 February 2012.
<hUp;//www,defensenews.com/article/20120202/DEF RLG04/302020003/1 ran-Ilians- 127-Perccnl-DefenseBudget-!ncrcase>
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defense hudgci was appro\iniaici> $12 billion.' It is unlikely ihai Iran's military
spending wi ll double in 20 1 .'. though there is ccriainl\ potential for Iran to divert
financial resources

tniliiaiw spending.

Figure 13: Mililaiw Kxpeiulilurcs ttf Middle Fastern Nations (in Billions of 2010 USD: 19882008
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Compared to other major nations in the Middle East. Iran's military expenditures
remained low between 1988 and 2008. though periodically went through periods of
growth. Iran's military expenditures peaked in 2006. but remained below the military
spending totals of both

Israel and

Turkes. Iran's military expenditures dropped

approximately 21.7 percent from 2006 to 2007. and dropped roughly 32.7 percent from
2007 to 2008. I lowever. Iran’s economy grew steadily from 2002 to 2007. giving the
nation the economic potential to increase military capacity.
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Ibid
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Iran’s Estimated Current Missile Arsenal and C aj)al)ilities
Iran’s missile arsenal contains a cc)iTibinatit>n
provided by China and North Korea, as

uutdaied Stu ict tnissi lcs, missiles

well as indigenoLislN ptx>duccd missiles. Iran s

leaders focus Iran’s indigenous weapons program

on the produetitm of ‘■cruise missiles.
Andrew Ross explains a five-stage

ship-to-ship missiles, and surface-to-air weapons,

industrv. In the first stage, components
process for development of a nation s defense i
the bu\er nati<.)n. In the second,
from foreign countries are imported and assembled b>
nations begin production of weapons components

under "license agreetnents with foreign

suppliers.” Next, “com pletc foreign-designed weapons
the fourth stage, nations are able to

are: produced under license,

modify- redesign, and reproduce

from foreign nations. Finally,, “domestically designed arms"
assistance.

77

Since 1998, Iran has not ordered miss

' In

w e£ ipons imported

a re: produced without foreign

ilcs from China, but Iranian missiles

i. indicating Iran has entered
are still based on Chinese, North Korean, and Soviet weapons
the fourth stage of national defense industry development.
78

the Middle I£ast.

According to

Iran has the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in
ballistic missiles are
Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense, most of Iran
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with a range o

f less than 500 kilometers, though
79

the Islamic republic is developing a mid-range

ballistic missile (MRBM ) program.

The

following chart shows missiles supplied to Iran by China recorded by SII

Cordesman, Anthony H„ Alexander Wilner. Michael Gibbs, and Scott Model! . ■
The GulfMiliiary Balance-I. The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions. Icnth I-.dition. C enter lo
Strategic and International Studies. 6 January 2013.
. . .
,oon i .-hffr.-//n
Ross, Andrew L. “Do-lt-Yourself Weaponry.” Bulletin of Atomic
J!.
web,cbscohost.com,umiss.lib.olemiss.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewc r.>sid bf^73tb2-01 8c-4d 1 1-ae3b
Icdafdc5b090%40scssionmgrll2&vid=l&hid=128> EBSCOHosl. University ol Mississippi . Acce.ssed 16
April 2013.
Hildreth, Steven A. “Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch ProgmrnsrC\m^n-essional Research
Service. 6 December 2012. 3. < hUp;//www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R4 2849.pdf^
’’ Hildreth, Steven A. “Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space I.aunch Programs.” Con^re.s.siona! Research
Sen’ice. 6 December 2012. 20. < hltp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/ R42849.pdf’>
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Missile Transfers from China to Iran, 1980-2009

>

Missile
Type

Year of
Order

Year(s)of
Deliver}’

6500

A mi-tank

1982

1982-1988

HN-5A

500

Portable
SAM

1985

1986-1988

HQ-2/CSA-1

150

SAM

1985

1985-1986

C-801/CSS-N-4

100

Anti-ship

1986

1987

HY-2/SY-1A/CSS-N2

75

Anti-ship

1986

1986-1987

PL-2

600

SRAAM

1986

1986-1988

PL-7

400

SRAAM

1986

1986-1988

HY-2/SY-1 A/CSS-N2

100

Anti-ship

1988

1988-1944

HQ-2/CSA-1

200

SAM

1989

1989-1991

C-801/CSS-N-4

125

Anti-ship

1992

1995-1998

C-701/FL-8

40

Anti-ship

1998

2001-2004

R-440 Crotale

250

SAM

1998

1999-2004

Missile Specification
1 Red Arrow-73

Quantit

Source: “Transfers of major con\ cnlional w eapons: sorted by recipient. Deals with deliveries or
orders made for year range 1980 to 2009.“ SlPRl Arms Transfer Database. 25 January 2013.
<hUp://wAvw.sipri.org/contents armslrad/at data.html>

Note that none of these missiles are ballistic missiles. According to a CRS Report
for Congress on Iran's ballistic missile capacities, Iran reportedly purchased an estimated
80

200 CSS-8 SRBMs from China in 1989.

SlPRl reports that an estimated 30 of the CSS-

80

Feickerl, Andrew. “Iran's ballistic Missile Capabilities."('RS Report for Congress. 23 August 2004. I.
<http://fpc.state.gov/documenls/organi/ation/39332.pdt'>
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MI

I'hc Chinese CSS-8 is

in 1980.
8 TEL launcher systems were sold by the PRC to Iran

that the C’SS-8 missiles
known as the Tondar-69 in Iran.*= Cordesman and Kleiber report
● I V [iwr’)
'’1 for use as a surlace-toir missile
1 IU--1
are “Chinese modifications of the surface-to-air
surface system,

.83

Since 1992. Iran has "been b uilding

of early 2013, Iran has still been unable to
84

missiles.

a sclf-sufllcicnt military." but as

domestical ly produce long-range ballistic

While unable to produce many

ballistic missiles. Iran does have the
issues to both increase range and payload,

technological capacity to modify pre-existing m
with a ''template" on
Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean missiles provide other nations
85

which to base domestic weaponry.
Appendix 1 gives a map

of the estimated ranges

of Iran's ballistic missiles. Given

current capabilities, Iran’s missiles arc capable ol reaching

as I'ar as central furkey to the

west and as far as southwest Pakistan to the east.
load of SRBMs and
Appendix 2 shows Posters analysis of range versus pay
MRBMs. As a caveat, Western reports show wide-ranging discrepancies in relaying the
conflict on the
estimated numbers of missiles in Iran’s arsenal. Furthermore, reports
range/payload capabilities of each type

of missile. Iran most likely docs not contain a
86

functional BM-25 missile, but could have access to some
Appendix 4 gives details of Iran’s weapons

BM-25 technology-’

arsenal, including those provided by
assisted Iran in

China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea, and those which these nations
!

producing.
●tiers made for
. Deals with deliveries or oi
‘Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by recipient
year range 1980 to 2009.” SIPRl Arms Transfer Database. 25 January 2013.
<http;//www,sipri.org/conlents/armstrad/at_dala.html>
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83
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Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
SRBMs con>iiuiic the majorii\ of missiles in Iran's arsenal, though a precise
87

inventory oflran's SRBM arsenal is not a\ailahle, according to Hildreth.' Iran's SRBM
arsenal includes the Shahah-1 and Shahab-2. Qiam. and Fateh-10. Iran likely possesses
hundreds of SRBMs.
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles
Iran's MRBM capabilities are not as de\eloped as SRBM capabilities. According
to Thielmann. the Sajjil MRBM. the "longest range and most survivable" missile tested
by Iran, remains non-operaiional and has not been tlown since February 2011.'^
Long-Range Ballistic Missiles
Iran docs not ciirrentl\ pos.sess an\ functional l.RBMs. Only China and Russia are
Kw

current LRBM threats.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies,

sanctions imposed in 201 1

by the U. S. and the F. If have helped slow Iran's

wo

development of LRBMs.
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Future Potential External Sources of Missiles and Missile l echnoloj^ for Iran
Current
Proliferation
91 ,92

Policy

F^eccnt
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I'conomic
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Russia
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North Korea

+

China
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China and North Korea are likely to be major sources of missiles and related
materials for Iran. Despite sanctions pressures on these two nations, both seek to maintain
lucrative economic ties w'ith Iran related to arms proliferation. China, as North Korea s
only major ally and economic supporter, has "failed to enforce rigorously

sanctions on

95

a

trade in nuclear and missile technology with North Korea,

ascribes a negative sign to the relationship between sources

Although the chart above
of missiles and missile

technology to Iran and the “Current Proliferation Policy,” private parties within China
have violated the NPT and MCTR.
Though Russia historically provided a huge quantity of arms to Iran, recent
sanctions have stifled arms transfers to Iran. According to RIA Novosli. Russia is "losing

?

arms markets in Asia and the Middle East [...] but gaining new ones in l,atin American

91
92 Non-proliferation
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X'

68

j

and

Alexander

Africa.'

Fomin, head

of Russia’s Federal Military-Technical

Cooperation Service, said arms trade with the Middle East has been affected by ongoing
97

conflict.

Sino-Iranian Arms Trade Relations
Iran has become China's most significant arms trade partner in the Middle East,
though during the Maoist era. the Middle East was of little consequence to China both
economically and strategically. There was little China could provide in the way of goods
to the Middle East, and vice versa.

However, as China's energy demands increased,

Beijing shifted from focusing on domestic issues to becoming a global economic
powerhouse. China, the world's fifth largest petroleum producer, depends on foreign
99

sources of oil to satisfy energy demands, China has also helped Iran develop its fiber
100

optics network and an $800 million subway system in Tehran.
Historically. China has been one of Iran’s major arms providers, whether the sales
were made directly or through third parties such as Pakistan and North Korea. The PRC
has provided Iran with various types of missiles and missile technology, assisted with
Iran’s LRBM
101

programs.

development, and contributed to nuclear and chemical weapons

China has provided assistance building missile production facilities in Iran,

particularly for the Nasr-1 anti ship cruise missile. According to Pham, Chinas
102

involvement in Iran's arms acquisition is “good for business
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However, the PRC supplied only a fraction of the missiles delivered to the Middle
103

East, peaking in the 1980s around 20% of total agreement and total delivery values.
Iu4

China sold $8 billion worth of arms to Iran and Iraq during the 1980s.

According to

Schicor, the poor quality of the PRC's missiles contributed to China's diminishing role in
the arms trade after the 1980s, In 1994 and 1996. Iran purchased a majority of its
weapons from China. Over the entire period between

1980 and 2009. China was the

largest supplier of missiles to Iran.
According to SlPRFs data bases, since 1998. Iran
missiles from China. This could indicate Iran
production base to the point that the Islamic

has not bought fully operational

has developed its domestic missile

republic no longer needs foreign missile

■ ■
nf sanctions related to the importation of missile
imports. However, continuing violations ot sanctions re
industrial base for producing
related materials indicates that Iran has yet to develop an
some components essentia! for ballistic m

issile production. Continuing violations of

nonproliferation treaties and sanctions, particularly by China, indicates that Iran depends
on China for. these components.
In March of 2013, the New York Times reported that an Iranian ship carrying
Chinese antiaircraft missiles was seized off the coast

of Yemen, d'he report indicates that

seeking antiaircraft missiles’* which
among the weapons seized were ten Chinese “heat105

were labeled QW-IM.

The missiles were produced by China Precision Machinery

Import-Export Corporation, a company san

ctioned by the U.S. government due to the

103

Shichor, Yitzhak. “China’s Upsurge: Implications for the Middle East '' Israel Affairs, Vol. 12. No. 4,
October 2006.665-683.
.
,,
104
Pham, J. Peter. “China’s ’Surge’ in the Middle East and its Implications for l .S, Interests. .● mencan
Foreign Policy Inleresis.3\: \T7-\93, 2009.
Iran." 2 March 2013 .
105
Worth, Robert F. and C, J. Chivers. “Seized Chinese Weapons Raise Concei ns on
The New York Times. <hup://w\vw.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/world/mid dlceast/seiz.cd-arms-oft-yemenraise-alarm-over-iran.hlml?pagc\vanted=a!!&_r=0> Accessed 21 April 2013.
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106

company's sales of “missile technolog> to Iran and Pakistan,’' according to the NTI.
The company ha5 also exported missiles with WMD capability.
Role of Sanctions in Sino-Iranian Counterproliferation
Capabilities required for an indigenous missile program include chemicals,
materials and metals, electronics. Technologically “weaker’* states including Pakistan,
North Korea, and Iran have advanced missile activity despite the MCTR’s restrictions on
107

the arms trade.

fhoLigh sanctions have limited China's weapons sales to Iran, China

finds avenues to skirt sanctions. From May 2012 to February 2013, Iranian oil revenues
108

dropped roughl> 45% due to sanctions, according to Iranian officials,

As an economic

monoculture dependent on oil production, Iran runs the risk of severe economic
repercussions if it incites further sanctions.
Rubin puts forth that China has realized the importance with maintaining
favorable bilateral relations with Israel, particularly in relation to Israel supplying hightech equipment to China. To prevent relations with Israel from souring, China must be
circumspect in selling arms to other nations in the Middle East. At the same time, China
seeks to maintain substantive economic ties with countries having unfavorable relations
109

with Israel.

Implications of Iran's Missile Program Expansion and Potential for Conflict
Mistry argues two political factors affect mission proliferation: first, “security
pressures from their regional system" and second, “political-economic pressures from the
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MO

global system.

According to Mistry. an increase in regional seciiril\ curbs the

security-related demands for missiles. Likewise, international pressures could be used to
decrease proliferation. However, Jervis provides a counterargument. Me believes simpl>
increasing the perceived security of states in

the Middle l-ast will not nece.ssarily bring

about a decrease in arms proliferation; conversely, the principles ot the securit\ dilemma
suggest an “increase in one state's security decreases the security of others
states cooperate in affairs regarding security, i.c.
increases the security of another state.

unless the

the increase in security of one state

Given the contentious relationships between Iran

and other nations in the Middle East, other nations will not likely perceive Iran s goals of
a more powerful missile arsenal as increasing regional secuiity.
nuclear-armed Iran
However, Waltz presents a counterargument. He believes
would “restore stability to the Middle East. * Waltz suggests Iran s pursuit of nuclear
weapons could end in three ways. First, Iran could “abandon its pursuit of a nuclear
bomb. Third,
weapon.” Second, Iran could develop a nuclear program, but not produce a
nuclear
Iran could continue to develop a nuclear weapon and publicize it by testing a
112

weapon,

, the Islamic
Waltz argues that even if Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon

nation would not use it as

first strike weapon against Israel, citing past precedent of
1 13

nuclear deterrence as evidence of validity,

On the other hand, if Iran’s acquisition of
Iran’s

nuclear weapons might spark an arms race in the Middle East. Sherrill suggests
acquisition of nuclear weapons would urge other nations to pursue nuclear weapons, most

no
Mistry, Dinshaw. Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology. Security Regimes, and
International Cooperation in Arms Control. University of Washington Press. 2003. 5.
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1 14

notably Saudi Arabia, I'urkcN. and l^g>pt.

Kroenig argues that a nuclear Iran would

1 I5

hinder ILS. influence in the region.
Rider’.s research shows that “rival slates experiencing threat to territory are more
likely to engage in an arms race than rival states experiencing threat to other types of
-1 16

stakes.

lie points out “there are economic costs associated with building arms” and
117

44

engaging in militar\ build-up risks the escalation of hostilities,

Currently, Iran does

not face significant regional militar\ competition. Though a degree of hostility exists
botv/een Iran and Israel, the two nations are not contiguous, so they do not share border
disputes. In the 1980s. fehran perceived Iraq as a threat to its territory, driving border
skirmishes between the two nations.
Iran views Saudi Arabia as its main economic competitor in the Middle East.
According to the CIA World Faetbook, Saudi Arabia holds roughly 17% of the world’s
oil reserves and constitutes the kingdom's main source of income. Saudi Arabia’s
118

estimated 2012 GDP reached $740.5 billion, with an estimated growth rate of 6%.
Though Saudi Arabia's estimated GDP in 2012 remains lower than Iran’s GDP by
roughly $250 billion. Saudi Arabia’s estimated growth rate for 2012 is 7% higher than
Iran’s growth rate. While Iran faces sanctions, Saudi Arabia enjoys preferential trade
agreements with the United States and increasing relations with China. According to
Henry Meyer of the New York Times, in December of 2009, China replaced the United
1 19

States as the main importer of oil from Saudi Arabia.

China’s developing relations with

I 14
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Riyadh will likely put a strain on U.S.-Saudi relations. Saudi Arabia depends on foreign
sources of missile defense and missile weaponry. According to SIl^Rl databases, the
I2U

.Arabia since 1979.

United States has provided vast quantities of missiles to Saudi

However, the Chinese sold Dongl-eng CSS-2 ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, and
121

remain in the kingdom to operate and maintain those weapon s\
the example of the Iraq-Iran War, if were

stems.

Judging from

to break out between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

. However, a Saudi-lranian war
China could potentially provide both sides with weapons
would be detrimental to China’s aspirations for energy security in the long run, but could
provide economic gains from weapons sales

in the short run. By having an economic

foothold in both Iran and Saudi Arabia, China can challenge the United States’ authority
the risks associated with
in the region. Whether or not Iran’s leaders are willing to run
Leader Ali Khamenei's
acquiring nuclear weapons merits an analysis of Supreme
motivations.
or use of WMD
In 2003, Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa ^‘forbidding the production
in any form.

122

How'ever, fatwas can be “altered in response to changing conditions,”

^
according to Eisenstadt and Khalaji.

Before Khomeini’s death, the Ayatollah asserted

that Iran has the authority to disregard the tenets of Islam when determined to behoove
124

the regime.

Thus, if the regime deems it necessary or in its own

interest, Iran will have

no issue in violating the Ayatollah’s fatwa declaring acquisition or

use of WMDs to be a

violation oflslam. In Iran’s cost-benefit analysis of nuclear weapon acquisition, religion
indubitably plays a role; albeit granted the authority for the Supreme Leader to disregard

120
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tenets of Islam, he could ostensibly use religious justification for obtaining nuclear
weapons or choose to continue to abide by the previous fatwa banning WMDs.
It remains unclear whether or not Iran is developing nuclear technology for
peaceful energ\ purposes, or is also developing nuclear weapon capabilities.
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Appendix 4: Iran’s Estimated Missile Capabilities
Specification

Range
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Pavload
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